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INTRODUCTION
Texas prides itself on being a little different than the rest of the states
and even the rest of the world.1 In 1996, the English Court of Appeal
t Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. B.A.,
Middlebury College; M.A., J.D., Washington University; M.Jur., Oxford University. I would like to
thank Lance W. Anderson and David B. Tulloch for their assistance.
1. As one Texan recently stated:
Texas is America's Mona Lisa. It's graceful, gawky, enigmatic, cantankerous. It is a
heroine of a thousand faces, a legend with more manifestations than the Buddha, the
oilman, the cattle ranch, the slacker, the cheerleader, and the high-society heiress
combined. Try to pin it down, distill it, define it, demystify it, and-well, good luck
amigo. Texas is a slippery lanker of a myth, whose weight and scale may be too vast for
words.
Shermakaye Bass, Eyes on Texas, AUSTIN AM.-STATSMAN, Jan. 25, 1998, at D14.
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confirmed that reputation and imposed an anti-suit injunction2 on a group of
English plaintiffs who had sought relief in the so-called "unconscionable"
Texas judicial system. 3 The House of Lords, in Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel,
4
overruled the Court of Appeal two years later, but it did not reverse the Court
of Appeal's specific findings regarding Texas law.5 Instead, the House of
Lords found, based on the principle of comity,6 that even if Texas justice was
completely deficient, it was not the job of the English courts to police the
Texas judicial system.7 The decision's practical effect was to allow a group of
British plaintiffs to proceed with its Texas lawsuit against a French
manufacturer for an accident that occurred in India. The global economy had
indeed spread into the area of tort litigation.
In early 1990, an Airbus jet crashed in central India leaving a large
number of people dead and injured, including three Americans and two British
families. As has become common these days, that disaster started a great
international tort race by the lawyers of the unfortunate victims. Over the next
nine years, the race proceeded through various courthouses, including the
Bombay and Bangalore courts of India, the state and federal courts of Texas,
and the civil courts of England. Despite this long and arduous route, the
parties to date have not even begun to argue the merits of the case. Hopefully,
this will be a suit where the outcome is determined as soon as the contest's
rules are decided.8
Although the English courts' series of decisions in the Airbus case
9
established no legally binding precedents in the United States, American
2. An anti-suit injunction is an order by a court against a party in personam "to restrain the
institution or continuation of proceedings in a foreign court." 1 ALLEN V. DICEY & J.H.C. MoRRIs, T-i
CONFLICr OF LAWS 408 (Lawrence Collins ed., 12th ed. 1993).
3. Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 8 (C.A. 1996) [hereinfter Pate 11].
This case was also reported in [1997] 140 Sol. 3. LB214, and The Times (London), Aug. 12, 1996, at 36.
The Court of Appeal was reviewing a decision by the English High Court (Queen's Bench Division),
Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. 465 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Patel]].
4. Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, [1998] 2 All E.R. 257 (H.L.) [hereinafter Pate 111]. This
case was also reported in [1998] W.L.R. 686, [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 631, [1998] 148 New L.J. 551,
[1998] 95/18 L. Soc'y Gazette 32, [1998] 142 Sol. J. LB139, and The Times (London), Apr. 6, 1998, at
41.
5. Patel III, supra note 4, [199812 All E.R. at 271.
6. The U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), provided the most often
used definition of comity:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or ofpersons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64.
7. See Patel I, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 270-71.
8. Lord Templeman noted in the preeminent English forum non conveniens case, "[I]n these
proceedings parties to a dispute have chosen to litigate in order to determine where they shall litigate."
Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 W.L.R. 972, 975, [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, 846 (H.L.).
A number of commentators have concluded that a grant of forum non conveniens or similar action is
"outcome-determinative in a high percentage of . . . cases." David W. Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 L.Q. REV. 398, 409 (1987).
9. When referring to the entire English case, including the opinions by the High Court, Court
of Appeal, and House of Lords, this Comment uses the term the "Airbus" case. When referring to each
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lawyers should find the case compelling for a variety of reasons. First, in a
voyeuristic way, it is always interesting to know what your neighbors in the
global community say about you (and your legal system) behind your back.
Second, the case offers some practical lessons to those who seek to represent
British clients in U.S. litigation. Third, the case is an educational case study in
complex international litigation and civil procedure. Finally, the Airbus case
presents a strong argument for the United States, like England, to adopt a
strict comity standard for granting anti-suit injunctions.
This Comment reviews a variety of issues that developed in the
aftermath of the Indian crash and its subsequent litigation. First, Part I
provides the fall factual and procedural history of the case as it has worked its
way through five court systems on three continents. Next, Part II reviews,
compares, and contrasts the English Court of Appeal's and House of Lords'
holdings and rationales in Airbus. Following this, Part III comments on the
Court of Appeal's mistaken presumptions regarding Texas law and on the
House of Lords' ruling regarding anti-suit injunctions. Finally, I argue that
based on the example of the Airbus case in the English courts, the United
States should abandon the laxer or national approach to granting anti-suit




On February 14, 1990, an Indian Airlines ("IA") domestic flight from
Bombay to Bangalore, India, crashed during its landing approach. Ninety-two
people died and fifty-four people were injured in the crash and the ensuing
fire. The passengers were predominately Indian, but eight British citizens
from two families were also on board. Four of the British passengers died and
four were injured (collectively, the "Patels"). u In addition, three Americans
were on board and all died in the accident (collectively, the "Lintons").
12
None of the Americans were Texans.
13
specific decision, this Comment uses Patel!, Pate!!!, and Pate 11.
10. Unless otherwise noted, the factual history is taken from the English Court of Appeal
opinion, which is the most detailed. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 9-14.
11. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 259. The House of Lords stated that the
Patels were British citizens of Indian origin with homes in London. See id. The Court of Appeal stated:
"[The Patels] were on holiday in India at the time, no doubt visiting relatives." Pate 11, supra note 3,
[1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 10. The commentators have followed the courts' lead and noted the Patels'
ethnicity. See, e.g., Adrian Briggs, The Unrestricted Reach of an Anti-Suit Injunction: A Pause for
Thought, 1997 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 90, 90 (1997); Jonathan Harris, Anti-Suit Injunctions-A
Home Comfort?, 1997 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 413, 413 & n.4 (1997); Phillip Mills & Jonathan
Leslie, The House of Lords Limits Anti-Suit Injunctions, INT'L COM. LITIG., June 1998, at 49. It is
unclear what, if any, significance the courts place on the Patels' ethnic origins or the purpose of their
visit to India. Nonetheless, the various parties' notation of the fact alone is somewhat odd and
incongruous to an American reader.
12. The reported American cases are titled after one of the U.S. victims, Laura Howell Linton.
See, e.g., Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Linton I1]. The federal
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The aircraft was an Airbus 320-231 ("A320") that had been designed,
tested, and manufactured by Airbus Industrie GIE ("Airbus") in Toulouse,
France.14 At the time of the accident, Airbus was a quasi-public corporation
made up of governmental, quasi-governmental, and private shareholders from
France, Germany, Spain, and England.' 5 Apart from delivery in December
1989, the aircraft had never flown outside of India. The plane was operated by
IA, which was solely licensed as a domestic Indian carrier. The pilots were
Indian nationals, but each had some minimal training at an Airbus training
center in either France
16 or the United States.
17
Following the crash, the Indian government established a board of
inquiry under the control of the High Court of Karnataka.18 The board of
inquiry conducted an investigation and took evidence regarding the cause of
the crash. In December 1990, the board published its results and concluded
that pilot error caused the crash. Specifically, the board found that the pilots
mistakenly programmed the jet to descend to an altitude of 700 feet, rather
than to descend at the rate of 700 feet per minute. The controls for setting the
altitude and vertical speed were next to each other on the airplane's control
panel. 19 The board also concluded that the Bangalore airport authority,
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), aggravated the injuries by having the
airport perimeter gates locked and by failing to have established adequate
rescue and fire procedures. 20 In conclusion, the board specifically found that
the crash was not caused by any failure of the aircraft, its controls, or its
engines.
B. The Bombay Case
Following release of the board's report, the various injured parties began
settlement negotiations with IA. The parties had not reached an agreement by
district court decision, which the Fifth Circuit reviewed on appeal, may be found in Linton v. Airbus
Industrie, 794 F. Supp. 650, 651-52 (S.D. Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Linton 1].
13. Two Americans killed were from Maryland. None of the opinions in the United States or
England reported the domicile of the other American victim, except to note that it was not Texas. See
Patel I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 10. In addition, the opinions do not state whether any
additional non-Indian nationals were killed or injured in the crash.
14. SeePatel, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 468.
15. The exact location and type of ownership of Airbus were critical in Linton I and Linton v.
Airbus Industrie, 934 S.W.2d 754,758-66 (Tex. App. 1996) [hereinafter "Linton IIr'], and are discussed
in detail in those cases.
16. See Patel I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 10 (noting that pilots had done some
training in France).
17. See Patel , supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 480 (statement of Justice Colman that
the United States "is the place also where the pilots were trained"). From the opinions, it is unclear
whether the pilots trained in France, the United States, or both.
18. See id. at 468.
19. None of the opinions specifically discussed under what product liability theory or theories
the Patels and the Lintons based their claims against Airbus. However, the Court of Appeal's description
regarding the airplane's controls suggests that the plaintiffs may have alleged a design defect in the
instrument panel. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 10. The inclusion of the
Aeroformation defendants, the Airbus training center, see infra note 28, also suggests that the plaintiffs
may have made a claim for negligent or defective pilot training.
20. See Patel , supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 468.
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the beginning of 1992, and the Indian two-year statute of limitations was
approaching. Therefore, on February 12, 1992, the Patels filed suit against IA
and HAL in the Bombay High Court.21 In their complaint, the Patels alleged
that IA was liable for gross negligence, recklessness, and willful misconduct
based on the pilots' error.22 In addition, the plaintiffs claimed against HAL in
negligence for keeping the perimeter gate locked, for not providing tools to
open the gate, for failing to coordinate the fire fighting, and for failing to train
adequately the emergency personnel for a crash outside the airport
perimeter.23 On March 6, 1993, IA and the Patels settled for the full amount
available under IA's liability insurance. For the four deaths and four injuries
suffered by the Patels, they received in total the Indian rupee equivalent of
approximately $200,000 plus costs.24 After paying for legal fees not covered
by the settlement, the Patels' net award was approximately $125,000. The
plaintiffs did not settle with HAL. As of 1998, that litigation was still pending
and had not been vigorously pursued by any of the parties.25
C. The Texas Case
26
On the same day the Patels filed the Bombay Case, the Patels and the
Lintons also filed separate cases in the Texas state court for Brazoria County27
against Airbus and its subsidiary responsible for training the pilots to fly the
28 29A320. 28 Both suits alleged numerous product liability and negligence claims.
21. The Patels were plaintiffs in the Bombay Case, see Patel 1, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig.
Proc. at 468, but it is not clear whether the Lintons were parties to this part of the Indian litigation.
22. See Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 468.
23. See id. at 468.
24. See id.
25. The House of Lords speculated that the inactivity against HAL might have been due to a
delay in the proceedings or due to difficulty in establishing that HAL was liable for the plaintiffs' deaths
and injuries. See Pate! IfI, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 259.
26. Because the English courts did not review the Texas proceedings, the facts in this sub-
section, unless otherwise noted, are from Linton 11, 30 F.3d at 594-95.
27. Brazoria County has attracted a tremendous number of foreign plaintiffs for reasons that
are at least partially unclear. See, eg., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1337 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (noting a case filed in Brazoria County by plaintiffs from, among others, Burkina Faso, Costa
Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, Saint
Lucia, and Saint Vincent).
The domestic defendants in most of these cases immediately remove the suits to the local U.S.
federal district court, which, in response to one foreign plaintiff's choice of venue, recently commented:
[G]iven the tremendous number of United States jurisdictions encompassing fascinating
and exotic places, the Court can hardly imagine why the [plaintiff] Republic of Bolivia
elected to file suit in the veritable hinterlands of Brazoria County, Texas. The Court
seriously doubts whether Brazoria County has ever seen a live Bolivian ... even on the
Discovery Channel. Though only here by removal, this humble Court by the sea is
certainly flattered by what must be the worldwide renown of rural Texas courts for
dispensing justice with unparalleled fairness and alacrity, apparently in common
discussion even on the mountain peaks of Bolivia!
Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
28. See Linton 111, 934 S.W.2d at 756. The defendants included Airbus Industrie,
Aeroformation (the subsidiary trainer), Airbus Industrie of North America, Inc., and Airbus Service
Company, Inc. (collectively, "Airbus"). See Linton I, 794 F. Supp. at 650. Airbus Industrie owned 90%
of Aeroformation and the courts essentially treated them as the same party. See id. at 652. The status or
outcome of the suit against defendants Airbus Industrie of North America, Inc. and Airbus Service is not
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Airbus immediately removed the cases to the federal court for the Southern
District of Texas, Galveston Division, basing its federal subject matter
jurisdiction on both federal issue jurisdiction
30 and diversity jurisdiction.31
The federal court, sua sponte, consolidated the Patels' and the Lintons' cases
for all purposes, to which none of the parties objected.32 Once in federal court,
Airbus immediately moved for dismissal of the entire consolidated suit based
on (1) lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) forum non conveniens, and (3)
immunity under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).33 In response,
the plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to the Texas state courts, arguing
that Airbus failed to meet diversity and federal issue jurisdiction requirements.
On July 22, 1992, the U.S. district court held in a detailed opinion that
Airbus was not a "foreign state or agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state' 34 under the FSIA and, therefore, it could neither invoke federal issue
jurisdiction nor claim immunity under the FSIA.35 Though the court did not
say so explicitly, the order appeared to remand the case back to the Texas
state courts.36 Airbus appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. On February 24, 1993, the Fifth Circuit in an
unpublished opinion dismissed the appeal, finding that the district court failed
clear from the opinions.
29. See Linton MI, 934 S.V.2d at 756.
30. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441 (1994). Section 1330(a) provides:
The [U.S. federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of any nonjuty civil action against a foreign state as defined in [28 U.S.C.
§] 1603(a) as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is
not entitled to immunity either under [the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] or under
any applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Section 1441(d) provides:
Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in [28 U.S.C.
§] 1603(a) may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 1332(a) provides, in part:
The [U.S. federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and
costs, and is between... (2) citizens ofa [U.S.] State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state; [or] (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
32. See Linton 1, 30 F.3d at 594.
33. See id. (referring to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1994)).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 provides, in part:
(a) A "foreign state" . , . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States... nor created
under the laws of any third country.
28 U.SC. § 1603.
35. See Linton 1, 794 F. Supp. at 653-54.
36. See id.
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to rule on Airbus's motions to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction and
for forum non conveniens. 37 The circuit court specifically instructed the
district court to rule on "defendants' motion to dismiss expeditiously.
38
After the circuit court had sent the case back to the U.S. district court,
but before the district court had ruled on Airbus's motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, the plaintiffs and Airbus voluntarily
entered into a stipulation agreement establishing the domicile of the parties.
In the joint stipulation, the parties agreed that one plaintiff was "stateless" for
jurisdictional purposes. It is not clear why Airbus entered into the agreement,
but the Fifth Circuit later presumed that Airbus hoped to bolster its forum non
conveniens claim by doing so.
40
On remand the district court was prepared to review the remaining issues
as instructed by the circuit court. In fact, the district court noted, but did not
rule, that had it addressed Airbus's motion it would have had to dismiss the
case for either forum non conveniens or lack of in personam jurisdiction.4'
Instead, however, the court immediately remanded the case back to the Texas
state courts for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.42 The district court
held that it lacked jurisdiction, because the stipulation agreement's domicile
provision destroyed diversity jurisdiction43 and the court had alreadt' rejected
federal issue jurisdiction by ruling Airbus was not a foreign state. In short,
the district court found that because it lacked any basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, it did not have the authority to rule on Airbus's motion to dismiss
for either forum non conveniens or lack of in personam jurisdiction.
45
Airbus again appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Although the circuit court
expressed sympathy for Airbus's plight,46 it nonetheless affirmed the
37. See Linton , 30 F.3d at 594 (citing Airbus Industrie v. Linton, No. 92-7564 (5th Cir. Feb.
24, 1993)).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 595.
40. See id. at 594.
41. The district court's opinion was not reported. This summary is found in Linton 11, 30 F.3d
at 594-95.
42. See id.
43. Stateless persons cannot invoke diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because
they are not "subjects of a foreign state." See 32A AM. JuR. 2D Federal Courts § 738 (1999) (citing
Shoemaker v. Malasa, 241 F.2d 129, 129 (2d Cir. 1957)). Therefore, the entire case failed to meet the
diversity jurisdiction requirements, because it lacked "complete diversity" among the parties. 32A AM.
JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 864 (1995).
44. See Linton 1, 794 F. Supp. at 653-54.
45. See Linton 1, 30 F.3d at 595.
46. In what turned out to be an ironic twist given Airbus's subsequent application to the
English court for an anti-suit injunction against the Texas litigation, the Fifth Circuit expressed its
sympathy by quoting to Airbus the English novelist Charles Dickens's account of England's cruel and
deficient judicial system from BLEAK HousE:
"I call them the Wards in Jarndyce. They are caged up with all the others. With Hope,
Joy, Youth, Peace, Rest, Life, Dust, Ashes, Waste, Want, Ruin, Despair, Madness, Death,
Cunning, Folly, Words, Wigs, Rags, Sheepskin, Plunder, Precedent, Jargon, Gammon,
and Spinach!" Like the poor Wards in Jamdyce, the Airbus Defendants have searched in
vain for resolution of their claim. We take comfort, though, in the fact that, unlike the
Wards in Jamdyce-who were forever consigned to wander about in the fog of Chancery
court-the Airbus Defendants will be able to have the merits of their claim of FSIA
immunity [but not forum non conveniens] heard, albeit in state court.
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remission to the Texas state courts. The Fifth Circuit concluded without
difficulty that if the district court did not have primary jurisdiction, then it
could not take appellate jurisdiction.
47
Back in the Texas state court system, Airbus renewed its efforts to have
the case dismissed under the immunity provisions of FSIA.48 However, it
consented to Texas jurisdiction and did not renew its arments based on lack
of in personam jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. This appears to have
been a concession to the fact that Airbus almost certainly satisfied Texas's
minimum contacts requirements having (1) sold A320s in Texas, (2)
purchased aircraft parts that were designed and manufactured in Texas, and
(3) trained pilots in the United States.50 Airbus also likely conceded the forum
non conveniens argument, because the Texas Supreme Court had held in 1990
that a state statute expressly required Texas courts to take jurisdiction in
wrongful death and personal injury cases brought in Texas courts even if the
injury occurred outside of Texas. On February 9, 1995, the state trial court
found that Airbfus was immune from suit under the FSIA and dismissed the
52 5case. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Texas state appeals court.5 3
D. The Bangalore Case
Concurrent with the battles in the U.S. federal courts and the Texas state
courts, Airbus launched a counter-offensive against the Patels in India. On
November 21, 1992, Airbus, which was not a party to the Bombay Case, filed
a declaratory judgment suit to determine the limits of its liability, if any, in the
City Civil Court of Bangalore, which had jurisdiction over the area where the
accident occurred.54 Three years later, following the appeal of the Texas state
Id. at 600 (quoting CHARLEs DIcl Ns, BLEAK HOUSE 922 (Nicola Bradley ed., Penguin Books 1971)
(1853)).
47. See Linton 1, 30 F.3d at 595, 600; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), (d) (1998) ("If at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded [to the state ourts].... An order remanding a case to the State court from which it
was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." (emphasis added)). The defendants continued
their efforts to remain in the federal court system by petitioning the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en banc,
see Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 36 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying petition for rehearing en banc), and
by petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, see Airbus Industrie G.I.E. v. Linton, 513 U.S. 1044
(1994) (denying certiorari). Both applications were denied.
48. See Linton X1, 934 S.W.2d at 757.
49. See Patel , suprd note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11.
50. See id.; Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 480-81.
51. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990) (holding that by statutory
mandate a Texas court could not refuse jurisdiction for wrongful death and personal injury cases
occuring outside of Texas); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (West 1990). The status of
Texas law of forum non conveniens in 1990 and later is discussed infra in notes 176-189 and
accompanying text.
52. See Linton II, 934 S.W.2d at 757.
53. The plaintiffs' appeal succeeded. See id. at 754 (granting the Patels' and the Lintons'
appeal of the Texas case's dismissal). For a discussion of the subsequent proceedings see infra notes
127-128 and accompanying text.
54. See Patel 11, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 12. Airbus also filed suit in the City
Civil Court of Bombay, but the High Court of Kamataka consolidated that action with the Bangalore
case. Ravinder Singhanin, Forum Shopping Basis for Stay of Proceedings, 5 INT'L CO. & COM. L. REV.
C-95 (1994) (commenting on the Indian case Airbus Industrie v. Linton, Misc. First App. No. 1405 of
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court's dismissal, Airbus brought and the Bangalore court granted a motion
for a permanent anti-suit injunction against the plaintiffs in the Texas case.
55
The Patels, through counsel, made a special appearance in the case and
actively argued against the injunction. 6 In deciding to grant the injunction,
the Bangalore court fully reviewed and considered the convenience,
appropriateness, and jurisdiction of both the Indian and Texan courts. 5 7 The
injunction order provided, inter alia: (1) The plaintiffs were not entitled to
proceed against Airbus in any court in the world other than in
India/Bangalore; (2) The action filed in Texas was not in conformity with the
laws of India; (3) India/Bangalore courts alone should determine the quantum
of compensatory damages; (4) The applicable law for any claim against
Airbus was Indian law, not Texas law; and (5) Airbus was prohibited from
withdrawing from the Bangalore Case at any point prior to the full settlement
of the plaintiffs' claims by an Indian court.
58
After the Bangalore court granted the anti-suit injunction, the Patels
simply ignored it.59 In doing so, the Patels became subject to sanctions by the
Indian court.60 However, because the Patels had no immediate and expected to
have no future physical or financial presence in India, sanctions were of
limited deterrence. Furthermore, because the injunctions were against the
Patels personally and because the Indian courts could not directly encroach on
the Texas courts' jurisdiction, 61 Airbus could neither request nor demand that
the Texas courts stay or dismiss the case based on the Indian injunction.
62
E. The English Case
Concerned that the Texas appeals court might not uphold the lower
court's dismissal, and with the Patels ignoring the Indian injunction, Airbus
1993 (Kamataka H.C. Feb. 9, 1994)).
55. See Pate!1, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 12. Airbus had initially sought anti-
suit injunctions against the Patels concurrently in both the Bangalore Case and the City Civil Court of
Bombay. The Bangalore court denied the injunction. Airbus appealed the decision to the High Court of
Karnataka and withdrew its application from the City Civil Court of Bombay. On February 9, 1994, the
High Court reversed the Bangalore court and granted Airbus a temporary injunction against the Patels,
pending disposal of the case in India. The High Court relied namely on the leading English anti-suit
injunction decision of Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] 1 App. Cas.
871 (P.C. 1987) (appeal taken from Brunei). See Singhanin, supra note 54, at C-96. The 1995
application sought to make the injunction against the Patels permanent. See Patel II, supra note 3,
[1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 12. It is notable that the Bangalore judge thus ruled on the request for a
permanent injunction after already having been overturned by the High Court on Airbus's application
for a temporary injunction ruling a year earlier.
56. See Pate 11, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 12.
57. See id.
58. See Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 469.
59. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 12. The English Court ofA~peal noted
that the Patels' Texas contingency fee lawyers financed the Indian defense. See id. The opinions do not
note, however, whether the Patels or the Texas attorneys financed the subsequent English defenses.
60. See id.
61. See infra note 147 (discussing the general effect on foreign courts of anti-suit injunctions
issued personally against a party).
62. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 12 ("Under the rules of private
international law, the judgment of the Indian Court creates no rights or obligations in this country.").
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tried another avenue. Airbus applied to the English courts: first, to recognize
the Indian injunction and, second, to issue their own injunction preventing the
Patels from pursuing their appeal in the Texas state courts.63 The practical
effect of either of these remedies was the same: Airbus would receive an
injunction that it could enforce in England, where the Patels were susceptible
to personal jurisdiction and sanctions.
The English anti-suit injunction claim was unique. It is not
unprecedented for an English court to grant an anti-suit injunction preventing
one of its citizens from suing in the United States in favor of forcing the
parties into the English courts.6a Here, however, Airbus asked the English
court to enjoin the American litigation and compel the British citizens to sue
in Indian courts. In the words of one lawyer, Airbus was asking the English
court to "act as an international policeman," refereeing between the courts of
two foreign jurisdictions-India and Texas.65 This was a difficult issue
because:
[T]he English court was being required to adjudicate between two or more foreign
jurisdictions and to conduct a comparative evaluation of the appropriateness of
proceedings in different foreign courts. It would be less able to carry out this exercise
than if it were comparing one foreign court with an English court as the alternative
forum.
66
The courts noted that this was a case of first impression in England.67
II. THE AIRBUS DECISIONS
A. High Court-Patel 168
The case first came before Justice Colman of the English High Court
(Queen's Bench Division),69 and on April 23, 1996 he denied Airbus's motion
63. See Patel 1, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 469-70. Had the Patels also perceived
that Airbus might go to England or Bangalore to get an injunction to prevent them from pursuing their
case, they may have sought an injunction from the Texas courts preventing Airbus from seeking an anti-
suit injunction against the Patels in England, India, or any other court-the so-called "anti-anti-suit
injunction." See Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Baker, 838 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. App. 1992) (granting
an injunction preventing defendants from asking a Canadian court for an anti-suit injunction against the
plaintiffs); Pittsburgh-Coming Corp. v. Askewe, 823 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. 1992) (same); see also
Michael Schimek, Anti-Suit and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions: A Proposed Texas Approach, 45 BAYLOR L.
REV. 499 (1993) (reviewing anti-suit injunctions).
64. See, e.g., Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] 1 App. Cas.
871 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Brunei) (permitting an anti-suit injunction in favor of the natural forum of
Brunei against a negligence and product liability suit in Texas arising out of a helicopter crash in
Brunei).
65. Pate! III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 262 (statement of Sydney Kentridge, Q.C.,
English barrister for the Patels).
66. Andrew Keltic, Anti-Suit Injunction, L. Soc'Y GAZETrE, June 26, 1996, at 26.
67. See Pate 11, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 14; Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l
Litig. Proc. at 478.
68. For an English perspective on Patel I, see Keltic, supra note 66, at 26; and Comment,
Anti-Suit Injunction, 15 Civ. JUST. Q. 270 (1996).
69. This is England's trial court for complex civil matters. See MARCEL BERLINS & CLARE
DYER, THE LAW MACHINE 25 (4th ed. 1994).
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to enjoin the Patels.7 ° In his ruling, Justice Colman found he could not enforce
the Bangalore injunction because, inter alia, English courts will only enforce
judgments for a quantified sum of money.71 Next, he turned to Airbus's
request for an English anti-suit injunction against the Patels' case in Texas.
On this issue he found that the court indeed had the authority to grant such an
injunction. 72 He determined that the test for whether such an injunction should
be granted was the same as the present test for standard anti-suit injunctions in
favor of English courts:7 3 An injunction will be granted where a party, who is
within the jurisdiction of the English court, pursues a claim that is vexatious
or oppressive in a foreign jurisdiction, which is not the "natural forum."
74
The court applied this test in two parts. First, it asked whether Texas was
the natural forum of the dispute and found that, despite some connections, it
was not.75 Second, the court considered whether the facts showed "the very
clearest case of oppression" that was "so obviously vexatious and oppressive"
that the Patels should be enjoined from pursuing the American litigation.76 In
applying this second part of the test, the court identified and balanced a
number of factors. In favor of Airbus it considered (1) that the evidence was
predominantly in India, (2) that Airbus was not able to defend in Texas under
a forum non conveniens theory, and (3) that because IA and HAL were not
subject to Texas jurisdiction, Airbus could not bring cross-claims for
contribution against them in the Texas case.77 On the other side of the scale,
the court weighed (1) that the Lintons would proceed with the Texas litigation
even if the court granted an injunction against the Patels, (2) that financially
the Patels could only pursue their claims in Texas, which allows for
contingency fee arrangements, and (3) that the Indian trial and appeal could
take between fourteen and sixteen years.78 The court also noted, in favor of
the Patels, that Texas provided for recovery under product liability theory and
allowed for the possibility of higher damages.79 Finally, after reviewing the
entire "extensive" and "voluminous" evidence,80 Justice Colman concluded
that the Texas case was "not vexatious or oppressive and accordingly, this is
70. See Patel , supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 484.
71. See id. at 477.
72. See id. at 479.
73. See, e.g., Socit6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] 1 App. Cas.
871 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Brunei).
74. Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 479. The "natural forum" is the forum
"with which the action has the most real and substantial connection." DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 2, at
403 (Rule 31).
75. See Patel 1, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 480-81.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 480-82.
78. See id. at 482-83.
79. See id. at 484.
80. Justice Colman stated that he based his opinion "[o]n the whole of the evidence." Id.
(emphasis added). In the appeal, Lord Justice Hobhouse noted that Justice Colman "had before him
extensive affidavit evidence with voluminous exhibits." Patel 1I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at
1 (emphasis added).
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not an appropriate case for the English court to grant an anti-suit injunction."
81
Airbus appealed to the Court of Appeal.
B. Court ofAppeal-Patel 1182
On July 31, 1996, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court and
enjoined the Patels from further pursuing their claims against Airbus in the
Texas state courts.83 Lord Justice Hobhouse (later to become Lord Hobhouse
of the House of Lords8o) wrote the principal opinion, which was joined
without comment by Lord Justice Aldous and with minor comment by Lord
Justice Nourse. Preliminarily, the appellate court affirmed Justice Colman's
holdings that the Indian injunction order was not enforceable in England and
that an English court had the authority to issue an anti-suit injunction in this
unique situation.8 6 After reviewing the relevant case law, the court also
affirmed the general "vexatious or oppressive ' 87 test Justice Colman used for
granting anti-suit injunctions.88
Lord Justice Hobhouse did not stop at this point, however.8 9 Instead, he
reconsidered and rebalanced the various factors identified by the High
Court,90 distinguishing both legally and factually the weight given to the facts
81. Patel, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 484.
82. For an English perspective on Patel II, see John Abramson, English Courts Restraining
Foreign Proceedings, 11 AIR & SPACE L. 20 (1996); Adrian Briggs, The Unrestricted Reach of an Anti-
Suit Injunction: A Pause for Thought, 1997 LLOYD's MAR. & COM. L.Q. 90; Jason C.T. Chuah, Stays of
Foreign Proceedings-Forum Non Conveniens-Judicial Discretion, 20 STUDENT L. REV., Spring 1997,
at 46; Richard Fentiman, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Appropriate Forum, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 46
(1997); Jonathan Harris, Anti-Suit Injunctions-A Home Comfort?, 1997 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q.
413; and Jonathan Leslie & Philip Mills, Anti-Suit Injunctions: The Jurisdiction of the English Court
Extended?, INT'L COM. LinTG., Nov. 1996, at 43. In America, the case was briefly summarized in Louis
Ellen Teitz et al., International Legal Developments in Review 1996: International Litigation, 31 INT'L
LAW. 317,319-21 (1997).
83. See Patel H, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 19.
84. A House of Lords law lord (i.e., a Lord of Appeal in the Ordinary) is roughly equivalent to
a U.S. Supreme Court justice. See BERLINS & DYER, supra note 69, at 58. Lord Hobhouse was appointed
to the House of Lords in the summer of 1998. See The Men Who Will Usher in a New Era in British
Law, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 1998, at 10.
85. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 19-20.
86. See id. at 12, 16.
87. Courts have also characterized "vexatious or oppressive" as "unconscionable." See South
Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantic Maatschappij "De Zeven Provincien" N.V., [1987] 1 App. Cas. 24, 40
(H.L. 1986).
88. Pate 11, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 16.
89. The court stated: "The exercise of discretion whether or not to grant the remedy was for
the Judge. However if he has not applied the right criteria or has not correctly selected and evaluated the
relevant facts and circumstances, this Court must, having determined the correct facts to be taken into
account and the correct legal criteria, exercise the discretion itself." Id. As in America, the English
appellate court must meet a high standard for overruling the discretion of the trial court. See Spilada
Maritime Corp. v. Consulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. at 847 (Templeman, L.) (stating that regarding the
review of a trial court's determination in dismissing under forum non conveniens, "[ain appeal [of the
lower court's discretion) should be rare and the appellate court should be slow to interfere") (emphasis
added).
90. Compare Patel II, supra note 3, (1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 16-19, with Patel I, supra note
3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 480-84 (both reviewing and weighing the same facts).
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by Justice Colman.91 The court applied a modified three-part balancing test.
First, it looked at where the natural forum was and was not. Second, the court
asked whether Airbus would be prejudiced by defending the suit in Texas.
Third, it considered whether the Patels derived any "legitimate" advantages
from proceeding in Texas.92
In applying the first part of the test, the court did not specifically state
where the natural forum was. The court noted that Bangalore was likely the
most convenient forum while France was probably a convenient forum.
93
Most significantly, the court found that Texas was an inappropriate forum,
stating cursorily that "there can be no question but that Texas is not an
appropriate forum for the determination of this dispute."94 This holding
regarding the inappropriateness of Texas as a forum was fundamental to the
court's decision because it set the tone for and the basis on which all other
factors were thereafter considered. 95 The court succinctly concluded its
discussion of the appropriate forum by stating:
[T]here is one forum, India, which is the appropriate forum; there is another forum,
France, which is an appropriate forum; the English claimants are seeking to sue in a third
forum, Texas, which is clearly inappropriate. The conduct of the English claimants is
prima facie oppression.
96
Underlying the court's finding that Texas was clearly an inappropriate
forum were its earlier factual determinations regarding forum non conveniens
and personal jurisdiction in Texas. As part of its statement of the facts of the
case, the court had found that "Texas law ... provided no basis upon which its
jurisdiction, or the continuation of proceedings in its Courts, could be
challenged on the basis of forum non conveniens." 97 Based on this finding,
Lord Justice Hobhouse argued that "unless an English Court is prepared to
give its own decision, the question [regarding forum non conveniens] will not
be decided by any Court having jurisdiction to do so. The Texas Court will
91. Lord Justice Hobhouse stated: "I do not consider that Mr. Justice Colman has set the tests
at the appropriate level for this case nor do I consider that he has correctly evaluated the facts and
circumstances which have to be taken into account." Patel 1I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 16.
See also id. at 18-19 ("In my judgment Mr. Justice Colman wrongly evaluated the factors which he had
to take into account in exercising his discretion .... It follows that in my judgment the exercise of
discretion by Mr. Justice Colman cannot stand.") (emphasis added).
92. See id. at 17.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. The one American commentator who has looked at this case observed that "[o]f crucial
significance to the ultimate decision appears to be the determination that Texas was an inappropriate
forum .... Teitz, supra note 82, at 320.
96. Patel I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 17.
97. Id. at 11. The court also stated: "The Courts of India, unlike the Courts of Texas at the
material time, recognize and apply the recognized [by England (?)] principles of forum non conveniens."
Id. at 12. The court stated that this lack of forum non conveniens was "peculiar to the state of Texas." Id.
at 11. However, other U.S. jurisdictions such as Louisiana have either rejected wholly or partially the
forum non conveniens doctrine. See, e.g., Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 576 So. 2d 978, 990 (La. 1991)
(holding that Louisiana courts may not dismiss cases for forum non conveniens except in cases
specifically provided for in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure). See generally Adrian G. Duplantier,
Louisiana: A Forum, Conveniens Vel Non, 48 LA. L. Rnv. 761 (1988) (reviewing Louisiana's doctrine
of forum non conveniens).
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not do so." 98 The court later similarly noted that "[the lower court] wrongly
excluded the fact that the Courts of Texas do not allow, in respect of this case,
any consideration whether Texas is an appropriate forum."
99
Lord Justice Nourse in his concurrence agreed that the key point on the
questions of whether the Texas court was an appropriate forum and whether
the suit was oppressive was the availability of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 00 He stated:
The key to both stages in the process is the Texas Court's disregard of the principal of
forum conveniens, the crucial significance of which did not come home to the Judge
[Colman]. As Lord Justice Hobhouse has pointed out, unless this question is considered
by the English Court, it will not be considered by any Court having the power to enforce
its decision.
10'
Lord Justice Nourse identified no other factors for overruling Justice
Colman's discretion.
102
In Lord Justice Hobhouse's leading opinion, the appellate court also
found that coupled with Texas's apparent lack of forum non conveniens, it
employed a broad definition of jurisdiction and, therefore, "personal
jurisdiction is very easily established in Texas."'1 3 The court noted that
personal jurisdiction could be found without personal presence based on prior
business dealings in Texas that had no connection to the subject matter of the
dispute.1t 4 The court noted, however, that Airbus eventually consented to
Texas jurisdiction. 105
98. Patel 1I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 16. The appellate court incorrectly noted
that France is "the Convention country under which the English claimants are obliged and entitled to sue
Airbus Industrie under the Brussels Convention." Id. at 17. The "Convention" and the "Brussels
Convention" is the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended by the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Oct. 9, 1978, enacted by Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1991, ch. 12, sched. 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter "the Brussels Convention"].
The Brussels Convention provides the jurisdictional rules for cases filed concurrently in European
Union Contracting States. See C.M.V. CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, JAFFEY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 60 (1997). Because the Airbus case involved actions filed concurrently outside the courts of the
European Union's Contracting States, despite involving French and English parties (as well as Indian
and American parties), it is arguable that the Brussels Convention was not applicable at all and would
not limit the forum to France. See In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd., [1992) 1 Ch. 72 (C.A. 1992)
(holding that even where a defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State, the Brussels Convention does
not prevent a Contracting State court from staying a case in favor of a non-Contracting State based on
forum non conveniens); see also Briggs, supra note 11, at 98 n.5 1 (questioning the correctness of the
appellate court's assertion regarding the application of the Brussels Convention).
99. Patel I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 19.
100. See id. at 19-20.
101. Id. at 19 (Nourse, L.J., concurring).
102. See id. at 19-20.
103. Id. at 11.
104. See id. at 11. The U.S. Supreme Court has provided the due process requirements for
extending jurisdiction as follows:
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's
activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the
State and the foreign corporation.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984).
105. See Patel I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11 ("Airbus Industrie does not dispute
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In the second part of the appellate court's balancing test, where the court
asked whether Airbus was prejudiced by the proceedings in Texas, the court
was primarily concerned with the application of Texas product liability law to
the case. The court began its discussion with the cursory and conclusive
factual determination that "[t]he liability, if any, of Airbus Industrie will be
determined by the Court in Texas on the basis of a strict liability under Texas
law which on the recognized principles of conflicts of laws has no place in
determination of its liability to the English claimants." 10 6 Further, the court
found regarding Airbus's liability that
[Airbus] will be exposed to a potential liability in [punitive] damages which has no legal
relationship to any wrong which Airbus Industrie may have done them. An award of
penal damages relates to the domestic policy of the state of Texas with which this
accident and the supply of this aircraft by Airbus Industrie to Indian Airlines have no
connection whatsoever. 
07
Based on the "implicit' 10 8 finding that Texas courts would apply Texas
product liability law and would impose punitive damages against Airbus, the
court concluded that allowing the litigation to proceed in Texas was "a
substantial injustice to Airbus Industrie."'
109
The court next held that Airbus's inability to get contribution from IA or
HAL in the Texas case would cause further injustice to Airbus. 110 In contrast,
Justice Colman had held that any injustice of this kind would not be resolved
by an injunction.!1" He reasoned that because the Lintons would continue to
pursue their claims even if the Patels were enjoined from proceeding in Texas,
Airbus would still have to defend the Texas suit.112 Therefore, no judicial or
economic efficiency would have been achieved by forcing the Patels into the
Indian courts.
Finally, for the third part of the balancing test-advantages that the
Patels might benefit from in Texas-the appellate court discounted any
financing advantages the Patels would receive proceeding in Texas as
that its acceptance of the personal jurisdiction of the Texas Courts was voluntary for the purposes of the
rules of private international law.").
106. Id. at 17. The court also stated: "The law of Texas is wholly irrelevant to the resolution of
the dispute applying acceptable [English (?)] conflict of laws rules." Id.
107. Id.
108. The court had based its factual determination on the bald affidavits of the plaintiffs and
concluded that "[i]t is implicit in this situation that it appears that any question of liability will be
decided by the Courts of Texas on the basis of Texas law not on the basis of a liability under any law
which has any connection with Airbus Industrie .... Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 17.
110. See id. at 17-18. In a very similar situation, the House of Lords had ruled that inability to
implead potential contributors was a significant factor in favor of granting an anti-suit injunction. See
Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] 1 App. Cas. 871 (P.C. 1987) (appeal
taken from Brunei). As a result, Airbus relied chiefly on this rationale in seeking its injunction. See Patel
I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. 465, 482 ("[The contribution argument] is heavily relied upon by
Airbus as a ground for its contention that it will be subjected to serious injustice if it is forced to litigate
in Texas ..... )
111. See Patel , supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 482.
112. Seeid.
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"illegitimate" advantages. n 3 The court acknowledged that because the Patels
could only finance their litigation against Airbus with the aid of contingency
fees, an injunction against the Texas suit would "in practical terms" preclude
the Patels from pursuing any claims against Airbus. I 4 Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that because it found the Texas case as a whole to be inappropriate,
the ability to perpetuate the case through contingency fees must be an
"illegitimate" advantage.1 15 The court also noted that the avoidance of any
delays that might be encountered in India would be a legitimate advantage of
the Texas courts but of "limited cogency," because it was unclear how much
longer an Indian proceeding would take than the Texas case, which had
already lasted four years.1I
6
In conclusion, the court found that Justice Colman had "wrongly
evaluated the factors," 117 and based on that failure, the Court of Appeal could
not let his decision stand."8 Then, in lieu of the lower court's balance, it
applied its own conclusions and held that because the suit in "Texas [was
both] clearly oppressive and cause[d] significant injustice to Airbus
Industrie," it was necessary to enjoin the Patels from pursuing their appeal in
the Texas courts.119 The Patels appealed to the House of Lords, England's
court of final appeal.
120
C. House of Lords-Patel I121
On April 2, 1998, the House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal and
denied Airbus's request for an anti-suit injunction against the Patels'
participation in the Texas litigation. 122 Unlike the Court of Appeal's approach,
the House of Lords did not specifically overrule the lower court's balancing of
the various factors. 23 Instead, in a speech 24 given by Lord Goff of Chieveley
113. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 18.
114. Id.
115. Id. ("Their use of the contingent fee system is part and parcel of their recourse to an
inappropriate forum causing injustice to Airbus Industrie, and consequently, is itself an illegitimate
advantage." (emphasis added)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 18-19.
118. See id. at 19.
119. Id.
120. The Patels appealed to the House of Lords with leave of the Appeal Committee. See Patel
III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 258. Parties to English litigation have no right to take an appeal to
the House of Lords; the appeal must be granted with leave by the Court of Appeal from whose decision
the appeal is made orby the House of Lords itself. BERLINS & DYER, supra note 69, at 29.
121. For an English perspective on Patel 111, see Kevin Browne, English Courts as
International Policemen?, 142 Sol. J. 524 (1998); Ingolf Kaiser, Anti-Suit Injunctions, 8 CORP.
COUNSEL, Apr. 1998, at 39; Philip Mills & Jonathan Leslie, The House of Lords Limits Anti-Suit
Injunctions, INT'L COMM. LITIG., June 1998, at 48; and Edwin Peel, Anti-Suit Injunctions-The House of
Lords Declines to Act as International Policeman, 114 L.Q. REv. 543 (1998).
122. Pate! III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 271.
123. See id.
124. Reflecting the historical dual nature of the House of Lords as a legislative and judicial
chamber, House of Lords' judicial opinions are referred to as "speeches" because they are delivered
orally in response to a motion to the house to allow or deny the appeal. See BERLINS & DYER, supra note
69, at 28.
210
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and agreed to by all other members, the court held that not only did the
foreign proceedings have to be vexatious and oppressive, comity required a
finding that the English court had a strong interest in the case. 125
The House of Lords began by restating the facts and noted three
additional developments that had occurred between the decisions of the Court
of Appeal and the House of Lords. 126 First, as Airbus had feared, the Texas
Court of Appeals overturned the Texas trial court's dismissal of the Texas
litigation. 27Airbus appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, but at the time of
the House of Lords opinion the Texas Supreme Court had not decided the
case.128 Second, in their appellate brief for the House of Lords, the Patels
stated that they would not seek punitive damages in the Texas case. 129 Third
and similarly, in oral arguments before the court the Patels' counsel agreed
that they would waive any reliance on Texas product liability law in the U.S.
litigation.
130
The court then used the bulk of the opinion to clarify the standard for
granting an anti-suit injunction.131 As discussed above, Justice Colman and
Lord Justice Hobhouse had applied the same test, which used a balancing test
to query whether a suit was "vexatious or oppressive" based on multiple
factors, including (1) where the natural forum was, (2) the prejudice caused to
the defending party, and (3) the advantages enjoyed by the initiating party.
132
In contrast, Lord Goff opined that comity required the court to focus not only
on the vexatiousness or oppression of the foreign case, but also on the
connection of the suit with England. 133 Under Lord Goff's formulation,
England's connection to the case was considered an independent and essential
element rather than merely one of the multiple factors to be considered when
determining whether the foreign case was oppressive. 134 In its practical
application, the court's approach translated into a two part test: (1) Does the
court issuing the injunction have a sufficient interest in the case and, if so, (2)
is the foreign proceeding vexatious or oppressive enough to justify
intrusion?
135
125. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 263-71.
126. See id. at 260.
127. See Linton HI, 934 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App. 1996) (granting the Patels' and Lintons' appeal
of the Texas Case's dismissal).
128. See Patel II, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.1R at 260. The Texas Court of Appeals
overruled a rehearing on December 5, 1996. See Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 934 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.
1996). The Texas Supreme Court denied writ on July 3, 1998 and a rehearing of writ of error on October
1, 1998. See Linton v. Airbus Industrie, No. 14-95-00371 (Tex. Oct. 1, 1998). The U.S. Supreme Court
denied writ of certiorari on February 22, 1999. See Airbus Industrie v. Linton, 119 S. Ct. 1039 (1999).
129. See Pate! III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 262.
130. See id. The court does not explain why the Patels made these concessions regarding the
applicable law and damages. As discussed below, however, this was likely a rational decision based on
the actual status of Texas law. See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
131. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 262-69.
132. See supra notes 73-81, 87-117 and accompanying text.
133. See Pate! III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 267, 270.
134. See id. at 267.
135. See id.
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Relying on a split among U.S. circuit courts, 136 Lord Goff referred to his
method as the "stricter approach" and the English lower courts' methodology
as the "laxer approach." 137 Goff argued that regard for comity dictated that
England follow the stricter approach and only grant injunctions where it
needed to protect its own jurisdiction or prevent evasion of its own public
policy.138 The court noted in support of this approach that the leading courts in
Canada, 139 Australia, 14 and part of the United States 14 1 had followed it.
Under the House of Lords' test, an English court has a sufficient interest
in the case if the foreign proceeding will impinge on its jurisdiction or evade
its public policy.1 42 As a practical matter, a party proves this interest by
136. The U.S. federal courts for the Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits apply the strict
standard. See Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 74-80 (3d Cir. 1994)
(denying an injunction against foreign executive branch); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d
1349 (6th Cir. 1992) (denying an injunction against Hong Kong proceedings); China Trade and Dev.
Corp. v. M.V. Coong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying an injunction against Korean
proceedings); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting an injunction
against English proceedings); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co, of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[D]uplication of insurers' and the issuer's delay in filing the London action
were the sole bases for the district court's injunction, and we hold that these factors alone did not justify
the breach of comity among the courts of separate sovereignties.").
The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and, perhaps, First Circuits apply the laxer standard. See Kaepa, Inc.
v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627-28 (5th Cir. 1996) (granting injunction against Japanese
proceedings); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431-33 (7th Cir. 1993)
(granting injunction against French proceedings); Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey
League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981) (granting injunction against Canadian proceedings). Some
commentators also add to this list Canadian Fitters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577
(1st Cir. 1969) (denying injunction against Canadian patent case). See also Markus Lenenbach, Anti-Suit
Injunctions in England, Germany, and the United States: Their Treatment Under European Civil
Procedure and the Hague Convention, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 257,261 (1998). However, it is
unclear from the Canadian Fitter's opinion what standard the court applied. See Canadian Fitters, 412
F.2d at 578-79. Others courts identifying the split between the circuits have not cited to this case. See,
e.g., Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1353.
137. PatelI, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R at 267.
138. See id. at 267. Under some formulations of the laxer approach the court will only consider
comity if the defending party can show actual evidence, such as a statement from the Department of
State, that an injunction will impair comity. See id.; see also Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (declining to require
the district court to apply comity generally); Allendale, 10 F.3d at 431 (same).
139. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. British Columbia Workers' Compensation Bd., 102 D.L.R.4th
96 (Can. 1993) (denying anti-suit injunction to enjoin Canadian citizens from bringing a tort action in
Texas state courts). Justice Colman also relied on this case. See Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig.
Proc. at 481. In contrast to the House of Lords, which cited this case for its respect of comity, Justice
Colman relied on the case only for its specific holding that Texas jurisdictional law was not
overreaching. See id. He quoted Amchem in part:
[A]lthough the Texas courts do not operate a forum non conveniens doctrine, as do the
Canadian courts, the application of the minimum contact requirement as a basis for
founding in personam jurisdiction, pursuant to section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, is 'consistent with [Canadian] rules of private
international law relating to forum non conveniens.' Specifically the jurisdiction is not
based on some 'long arm' legislation such as the United States Anti-Trust laws.
Id. (quoting Amchem, 102 D.L.R.4th at 123). Commentators have noted conspicuous absence of
Amchem from the Court of Appeal's decision. See Fentiman, supra note 82, at 47 ("[Amchem is] oddly
missing from the judgments on appeal in Airbus.').
140. See CSR America, Inc. v. Cigna Ins. Austl. Ltd. (1997) 146 A.L.R. 402,437-38 (Austl.).
141. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,
731 F.2d 909 (3d Cir. 1994).
142. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 267.
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showing that England is the natural forum.143 While the High Court and Court
of Appeal inquired into the appropriate forum for the case,144 the House of
Lords inquiry differed because it required a finding that England was the
natural forum. Thus, the House of Lords approach shifts the reviewing court's
focus on the appropriateness of the forum from the foreign court to the
English court. For example, under the laxer standard the lower courts asked
whether Texas was the natural forum, an appropriate forum, or an
inappropriate forum.145 In contrast, the House of Lords in Patel III asked what
England's connection to the case was and whether England was the natural
forum. 146 This focus emphasizes that the initial and crucial issue is not
whether foreign courts are acting in some inappropriate manner, but whether
the English courts should act to disrupt comity by interfering with the foreign
court's jurisdiction. 147
Though the court's formulation required that, for the most part, the
reviewing court must find England to be the natural forum before issuing an
anti-suit injunction, 148 Lord Goff also recognized two exceptions to this rule.
First, in the so-called "single-forum" cases, 149 where a claim exists only in the
foreign court, Lord Goff left open the possibility that an English court may
143. See id. at 269.
144. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 17; Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l
Litig. Proc. at 480-81.
145. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 17.
146. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 269.
147. The courts on both sides of the Atlantic now acknowledge that an anti-suit injunction
indirectly interferes with the foreign court's jurisdiction over the proceedings, though technically the
injunction is only directed in personam at the plaintiff in the foreign litigation. In America, in response
to an English High Court's injunction, which impacted the Laker antitrust case before it, the U.S.
District Court of the District of Columbia noted:
The British court appears to have rationalized its action on the grounds that its injunction
operate only on the plaintiff, not [the U.S.] Court .... At least in this country, as the
Supreme Court held over a century ago, there is no difference between addressing an
injunction to the parties and addressing it to the foreign court itself .... [The British
judge] has also stated ... that the type of injunction he issued "does not represent an
interference by one court with the proceedings of another." With the utmost respect, this
Court must differ. It can hardly be said that an order which, for example, directs a party
not to file further papers in this court.., is anything other than a direct interference with
the proceedings in this Court.
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1128 n.14 (D.D.C. 1983) (citations
omitted). In response, Lord Scarman of the House of Lords later agreed:
The approach [to granting an anti-suit injunction] has to be cautious because an
injunction restraining a person within the jurisdiction of the English court from pursuing
a remedy in a foreign court where, if he proves the necessary facts, he has a cause of
action is, however disguised and indirect, an interference with the process of justice in
that foreign court.
British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985] 1 App. Cas. 58, 95 (H.L. 1985).
148. See Patel II, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 269.
149. Peel has briefly, but insightfully, criticized the distinction between multi-forum and
single-forum anti-suit injunction cases as illusory. See Peel, supra note 121, at 544. He states:
It may well be in certain cases, like those involved in the Laker anti-trust litigation, that
the plaintiff may have no prospect of success on the merits in an [alternative] court; but
this does not mean there is a single forum available for resolution of his claim, and it is
quite wrong to describe these as cases "where England was not available at all for the
trial of the main action."
Id. (quoting, in part, Harris, supra note 11, at 422 (emphasis added)).
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intervene despite not being the natural forum, as long as there was a sufficient
connection. This single-forum distinction accommodated holdings such as
the notorious Midland Bank PLC v. Laker Airlines Ltd.,151 in which even
though England was not the natural forum, the Court of Appeal enjoined a
British airline from pursuing a U.S. antitrust case when there were no similar
antitrust claims available in England.
1 52
In addition to the single-forum situation, the House of Lords ruled that in
an "extreme case" an English court might grant an injunction even where it
has no interest.1 53 The court provided this exception to ensure that courts did
not apply the strict comity test "too rigidly."'154 For guidance as to what
constituted an "extreme case," the court noted that it should be found in those
situations where an English court would normally not give comity respect to a
foreign jurisdiction's laws. 155 The court added that despite Lord Justice
Hobhouse's opinion to the contrary, the Texas court's failure to consider
forum non conveniens did not constitute an extreme case, because the forum
non conveniens doctrine was not universally accepted and in fact was rejected
wholly by most civil law countries. 156 Further, the lords found that the natural
forum's inability to restrain the foreign proceeding, such as India's vis-a-vis
the Patels, would neither satisfy a showing that the English court had a
sufficient interest in the case nor constitute an extreme case. 157 The court
150. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 269.
151. [1986] 1 Q.B. 689 (C.A. 1986).
152. The Laker series of cases also produced the leading comity or stricter approach opinion in
the United States. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Laker cases
raised a number of issues similar to those raised in Airbus, but a full discussion of the various issues in
Laker is beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed account of the Laker litigation see, for example,
Aryeh S. Friedman, Laker Airways: The Dilemma of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Conflicting National
Policies, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 181 (1985); Monroe Leigh, Application of American Antitrust Laws to
Foreign Defendants-Concurrent Prescriptive Jurisdiction-Defensive "Anti-Suit" Injunction Upheld,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1984) (reviewing Laker); Monroe Leigh, Conflict of Laws-Anti-Suit
Injunction-English Court's Injunction Halting Antitrust Proceedings in US. Court Dissolved, 79 AM.
J. INT'L L. 141 (1985) (reviewing British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413
(H.L. 1984)); Monroe Leigh, Jurisdiction-International Antitrust-Rights of Foreign Citizens To
Petition Their Government for Redress of Grievances-Comity, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1069 (1985)
(reviewing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984));
Daryl A. Libow, The Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional "Rule of Reason" Applied to
Transnational Injunctive Relief, 71 CORNELL L. Rav. 645 (1986); and C. Paul Rogers, Still Running
Against the Wind: Comment on Antitrust Jurisdiction of Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 50 J. AIRL. & COM. 931 (1985).
153. Patel HI, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 270.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See id. The court noted earlier in the opinion that Japan, a civil law country, appeared to
employ a forum non conveniens doctrine. See id. at 263 (citing Ellen Hayes, Forum Non Conveniens in
England, Australia, and Japan: The Allocation of Jurisdiction in Transnational Litigation, 26 U.B.C. L.
REV. 41, 54-63 (1992)). See also Fentiman, supra note 82, at 47-48 (arguing that the English courts'
approach to forum non conveniens should not discriminate blindly between legal systems that offer
reliance on the theory and those that do not, such as the civil law countries).
157. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 270-71. In response to Airbus's argument
that England should assist the Indian court, the natural forum, in its efforts to enjoin the Patels, the
House of Lords noted that the normal process to do this was by enforcing or recognizing a judgment of
the Indian court. See id. at 270. In this case, however, the court could not consider such assistance
because the High Court had denied recognition and enforcement of the Indian injunction, and Airbus
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summarized: "The basic principle is that only the courts of an interested
jurisdiction can act in the matter; and if they are powerless to do so, that will
not of itself be enough to justify the courts of another jurisdiction to act in
their place."
158
Because the House of Lords found that England had no interest in the
case, it never asked the question upon which the lower courts had disagreed-
whether the Patels' suit in Texas was "oppressive or vexatious." 159 The court
did comment that had it reached this issue, it would have found that the Texas
proceedings were not oppressive, because before the House of Lords the
Patels agreed not to rely on Texas product liability law or seek punitive
damages. 160 The court specifically stated, however, that it was not reviewing
this part of the Court of Appeal's decision and, therefore, it was neither
approving nor disapproving of the appellate court's decision to overrule
Justice Colman's discretionary determination.
161
The court concluded by setting aside the Court of Appeal's injunction
and allowing the Patels to proceed with the Texas case. 162 As a postscript, the
court added that Texas, "like other common law Jurisdictions, [has now]
adopted the principle of forum non conveniens."163 Therefore, the court
speculated that a case like Airbus would not arise again.164
H. ANALYSIS
Two impressions emerge from the Airbus opinions. First, Americans
should be concerned by the Court of Appeal's view of Texas justice. This
concern might, perhaps, be founded in part on the wounded pride of having an
outsider adjudge one's own legal system as unconscionable. However, more
alarming is the fact that the Court of Appeal's conclusions are largely
grounded on facially incorrect interpretations of and assumptions regarding
Texas law. Quite simply, the Court of Appeal failed to understand the facts of
had not appealed this decision to the House of Lords. See id. at 270.
158. Id.at271.
159. Id. Peel concluded on this point that "[i]f England had been the natural forum, or at least
had had a sufficient connection with the claim, there seems little doubt that an injunction would have
been granted on the grounds that the Texas proceedings were vexatious and oppressive." Peel, supra
note 121, at 544.
160. See Pate 111, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.P. at 271.
161. See id. The court seemed to hint that it did not approve of the Court of Appeal's mere
reweighing of the facts. See id.; see also supra note 89 (discussing the deference of appellate review to
the trial court's determination regarding the forum non conveniens factors). The House of Lords stated:
It should not however be inferred from the mere fact that your Lordships have not
reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeal to interfere with Colman J's exercise of his
discretion that, had the point arisen, your Lordships would necessarily have approved of
the decision of the Court of Appeal in this respect.
Pate! II, supra note 4, [1998] All E.R. at 271.
162. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] All E.R. at 271.
163. Id.; see also infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the scope and extent of
Texas's new statutory forum non conveniens doctrine).
164. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] All E.R. at 271. Ominously, however, the court also
noted that civil law jurisdictions continue not to recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine. See id.
Therefore, it appears that the possibility of a similar case indeed still exists.
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the case and the substantive and procedural laws of Texas and the United
States. Second, in contrast to the Court of Appeal's approach, one is
impressed with the House of Lords' decision and its overall respect for the
policies of comity and its consideration of and reliance on foreign legal
theories. While some American courts in some cases would follow a similar
approach, none have articulated so clearly the legal theories and international
environment in which the courts necessarily act.
A. An English Court's View of Texan Justice
The Court of Appeal's opinion by Lord Justice Hobhouse both directly
and indirectly exposes contempt for, among other things, Texas jurisprudence,
Texas lawyers, and the Patels. 16s However, the opinion is largely based on a
misunderstanding of the facts of the case, a misinterpretation of the
substantive and procedural law of Texas, and a disregard for the respect that
comity requires one nation to give to another legal system. 166 Specifically, in
reaching his decision that Texas justice would be oppressive, Lord Justice
Hobhouse largely relied on incorrect assumptions regarding three aspects of
the Texan (and American) legal system: (1) the scope of personal jurisdiction,
(2) the applicability of U.S. products liability law, and (3) the nature of a
contingency legal fee system. These errors combined with a lack of
consideration for the U.S. legal system to produce a decision that the House of
Lords had no choice but to overturn.
165. One might ask whether Lord Hobhouse had any motive for preferring a French
corporation's concerns over those of a British citizen's. Because Britain's commercial interest in Airbus
was indirect and limited, see Linton 111, 934 S.W.2d at 758 (stating that the private company British
Aerospace's ownership in Airbus was twenty percent), financial protectionism does not seem applicable.
The answer may, in part, be the judge's inherent and altruistic disdain for legal maneuvering (what some
would call blatant "forum shopping") by parties such as the Patels. More cynically, one may get the
impression that the Lord Justice had an unconsciously prejudicial suspicion and distrust of non-English
legal systems (for example, the American legal system). Lord Hobhouse had stated before his opinion
regarding the unappealing nature of foreign and international law in comparison to the English judicial
system. See, e.g., J.S. Hobhouse, International Conventions and Commercial Law: The Pursuit of
Uniformity, 106 L.Q. REV. 530 (1990) (arguing against international conventions on commercial law
and in favor of the domestic legal system).
166. In Lord Justice Hobhouse's defense, Airbus's and the Patels' English counsel may be
chiefly responsible for the decision's errors on Texas law, due to their failure to fully educate the court
on the correct status of the law. Comparative Anglo-American commentators have noted that "English
judges tend to assume that, if something ought to be brought to their attention in a particular case,
counsel will do it for them." P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW 283 (1987).
One reason for the parties' failure to clearly and correctly present Texas law was that it was not
in their best interest to do so. Obviously, Airbus benefited from Lord Justice Hobhouse's exceedingly
negative presumptions about Texas law, even if they were not completely accurate. As for the Patels'
lawyers, they too were constrained from pleading a more accurate and temperate view of Texas law,
because Airbus could use such pleadings as admissions in Texas court to prevent the Patels and the
Lintons from arguing some of their more extravagant and less legally founded claims. Moreover, it
should be noted that English judges, unlike their American counterparts, review the case pleadings and
conduct the necessary background research without the benefit of law clerks. See id. at 279-80, 283.
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1. Texas Personal Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens
In granting the injunction against the Patels, the Court of Appeal placed
significant weight on its factual determination that Texas courts did not or
would not dismiss a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens or for
lack of personal jurisdiction. This holding, however, was incorrect.
First, it is clear that the defense of forum non conveniens was available
in the U.S. federal courts of Texas.167 In fact, Airbus had pleaded the doctrine
and a federal district court judge was prepared to dismiss based on it.
168
Nonetheless, Airbus, by its own action, lost the opportunity to rely on the
defense when it voluntarily entered into the domicile stipulation agreement.
169
Because this was an action within its control, the consequences of the act
should fall wholly on Airbus (and its legal counsel). 170 In the similar situation
where a defendant fails to timely plead lack of personal jurisdiction, in both
the United States171 and England, 72 the defendant is bound by his acts no
matter how harsh the outcome.
Therefore, contrary to the Court of Appeal's characterization, Airbus did
have an opportunity to plead forum non conveniens, but due to its own
oversight the bid failed. One suspects that this fact was hidden in the
"complicated procedural manoeuvres" that both the High Court and the Court
of Appeal declined to describe, or perhaps even review. 173 Given that but for
167. See, e.g., Linton 1, 30 F.3d at 594 (noting that forum non conveniens could be relied upon
in Texas). Interestingly, the availability of forum non conveniens in the federal court was the Texas
legislature's primary rationale for recodifying the doctrine into Texas law in 1993. See Carl C. Scherz,
Section 71.051 of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code-The Texas Legislature's Answer to Alfaro
and Forum Non Conveniens, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 109 n.47 (1994) (citing the legislative history to
TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051-Forum Non Conveniens). The Texas legislature was
concerned that Texas corporations would be prejudiced by the absence of a forum non conveniens
defense when sued by foreign plaintiffs in Texas state courts. It reasoned that because Texas
corporations were not able to remove their cases to the federal courts based on diversity jurisdiction,
only Texas corporations would not be able to avail themselves of the federal courts for seeking dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds. See id.
168. See Linton 11, 30 F.3d at 594-95.
169. See id.
170. The issue was not raised in the opinions, but Airbus's counsel's willingness to enter the
domicile stipulation agreement, which destroyed federal diversity jurisdiction and consequently
deprived Airbus of the forum non conveniens defense, might arguably be a cause for a malpractice suit
by Airbus against its counsel. Correspondingly, this raises another lesson of the Airbus case for local
counsel to be aware of when representing foreign parties. See infra Subsection Ill.A.4.
171. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) ("A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person... is
waived (A) if omitted from a motion [for consolidation of defenses] or (B) if it is neither made by
motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof pernitted ... as a
matter of course.').
172. In England, a party is deemed to submit to English jurisdiction if he fails to challenge that
jurisdiction prior to defending the action on the merits. See Rules of Supreme Court, Order 12, Rules
8(1), 8(7), S.I. 1965, No. 1776. The same proposition is true for those cases arising under the Brussels
Convention. See Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain, 1981 E.C.R. 1671, [1982] 3
C.M.L.R. 1 (E.C.L 1981) (holding under article 18 of the Brussels Convention that if a defendant does
not contest personal jurisdiction at the first opportunity available he will be deemed to consent to
jurisdiction); see also CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 98, at 73-74, 97-98 (discussing the Brussels
Convention rule).
173. The High Court stated: "Following procedural manoeuvres of astonishing complexity it
was decided by the Texas State District Court on 9 February 1995 that Airbus and Aeroformation were
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Airbus's own actions the defense would have been available, the real issue
before the English courts was whether to grant an anti-suit injunction where
the plaintiffs themselves made the defense of forum non conveniens
unavailable. Under the English precedent of In re Maxwell Communication
Corp. PLC (No. 2),174 which holds that a foreign court should be able to
determine its own jurisdiction before an English court will grant an
injunction, 175 it seems highly unlikely that an English court would grant an
anti-suit injunction based on this revised issue.
Second, the appeal court's reliance on Texas's lack of forum non
conveniens is misplaced because Texas in fact recognized the principle. 176 The
shape and scope of Texas's forum non conveniens doctrine, however, was
different than England's.177 But rarely are mere differences in the scope
accorded to a discretionary theory justification for infringing on the
jurisdiction of another nation's courts.
178
Texas has employed the forum non conveniens doctrine since at least the
1890s. 179 In contrast, England only began to recognize the theory in 1974,
immune from suit in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act." Patel!, supra note
3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 468 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeal similarly stated: "In Texas there
have been complicated procedural manoeuvres with the transfer of the various actions from one Court
to another and their consolidation. It is not necessary for me, any more than it was for Mr. Justice
Colman, to describe them in detail." Patel!!, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 10-11 (emphasis
added).
174. [1992] B.C.C. 757, 762, 774 (C.A.).
175. See id. at 762 (Hoffman, J.) ("Today the normal assumption is that an English court has no
superiority over a foreign court in deciding what justice between the parties requires and in particular,
that both comity and common sense suggest that the foreign judge is usually the best person to decide
whether in his own court he should accept or decline jurisdiction, stay proceedings, or allow them to
continue.!).
176. See, e.g., Direct Color Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 929 S.W.2d 558, 563 n.1, 567
(Tex. App. 1996) (granting a forum non conveniens motion not brought under the Texas forum non
conveniens statute); Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Tex. App. 1991) (holding that Texas
continued to recognize the validity of forum non conveniens for all cases except the limited cases noted
inAlfaro).
177. For discussions regarding Texas forum non conveniens, see generally Bill C. Anderson,
Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro: Forum Non Conveniens-Now Isn't That Convenient?, 42 BAYLOR L.
REV. 375 (1990); Joseph M. House, Dow Chemical Company and Shell Oil Company vs. Domingo
Castro Alfaro: The End of Forum Non Conveniens?, 54 TEX. BJ. 558 (1991); Michael T. Manzi, Dow
Chemical Company v. Castro Alfaro: The Demise of Forum Non Conveniens in Texas and One Less
Barrier to International Tort Litigation, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 819 (1991); Marc C. Mayfield, Dow
Chemical Company v. Alfaro: Aiding the Decline of the Alternative Forum, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 213
(1991); Christopher M. Rossomondo, Dismissal of Suits Under Forum Non Conveniens, 32 HARV. INT'L
L.J 517 (1991); Carl C. Scherz, Section 71.051 of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code-The Texas
Legislature's Answer to Alfaro: Forum Non Conveniens in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death
Litigation, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 99 (1994); Joel P. Trachtman, Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 760 (1990); and Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Forum Non Conveniens Legislation in
Texas, 55 TEX. BJ. 346 (1992).
178. See Fentiman, supra note 82, at 47-48. Fentiman states:
It should not be enough, as it was in [Pate! II], that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
is lacking abroad, for the foreign court may have other means of regulating its
proceedings.... It is not that [jurisdictions without the forum non conveniens doctrine]
cannot measure the appropriateness of proceeding, merely that all proceedings are
appropriate once a court is seised.
Id. at 47.
179. See, e.g., Morris v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 14 S.W. 228 (Tex. 1890) (recognizing the concept
but not referring to it as forum non conveniens). The first Texas decision to use the term forum non
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over eighty years after Texas.180 Between 1990 and 1993, Texas did, however,
have a narrower version of the doctrine than England in one respect.181 By
statute, the Texas legislature had limited its courts' discretion to dismiss or
stay for forum non conveniens when the action was for death or personal
injury.18 2 For all other justiciable claims, however, the doctrine survived.
18 3
The Texas Supreme Court held that the statutory limitation was a
legislative mandate intended to constrict the scope of forum non
conveniens was Garrett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 218 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
180. See Atlantic Star, [1974] 1 App. Cas. 436 (H.L.) (recognizing the concept but not referring
to it as forum non conveniens). The first English decision to expressly apply the term forum non
conveniens was Abidin Daver, [1984] 1 App. Cas. 398, 411 (C.A.).
181. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990). The statute that Alfaro
interpreted as eliminating the doctrine of forum non conveniens for death or personal injury cases
outside of Texas was enacted in 1913. See Act of Apr. 8, 1913, ch. 161, 33d Leg., 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws
338, 338-39. Texas courts applied this statute inconsistently until Alfaro. See Scherz, supra note 167, at
104-05. The Texas legislature statutorily reintroduced forum non conveniens for these claims in 1993
when it enacted section 71.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Act of Feb. 24,
1993, S.B. 2, ch. 4, § 1, 73rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1993). Section 71.051, however, only applies to
claims filed after September 1, 1993. See id. § 2. Whether the Texas courts since 1993 have applied
forum non conveniens under section 71.051 in a stricter or laxer manner than other jurisdictions is
difficult to tell, because no cases interpreting the statute have been reported to date. Section 71.051
provides, in part:
(a) With respect to a plaintiffwho is not a legal resident of the United States, ifa court of
this state, on written motion of a party, finds that in the interest of justice a claim or
action to which this section applies would be more properly heard in a forum outside
this state, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens and may stay or dismiss the claim or action in whole or in part on any
conditions that may be just.
(b) With respect to a plaintiff who is a legal resident of the United States, on written
motion of a party, a claim or action to which this section applies may be stayed or
dismissed in whole or in part under the doctrine of forum non conveniens if the party
seeking to stay or dismiss the claim or action proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
(1) an alternative forum exists in which the claim or action may be tried;
(2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy;
(3) maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state would work a
substantial injustice to the moving party;
(4) the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties or otherwise,
can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants properly joined to the
plaintiffs claim;
(5) the balance of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of the
state predominate in favor of the claim or action being brought in an alternate
forum; and
(6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplication or
proliferation of litigation.
(c) The court may set terms and conditions for staying or dismissing a claim or action
under this section as the interests ofjustice may require, giving due regard to the
rights of the parties to the claim or action. If a moving party violates a term or
condition of a stay or dismissal, the court shall withdraw the order staying or
dismissing the claim or action and proceed as if the order had never been issued.
Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall have continuing jurisdiction for the
purposes of this subsection.
Id. § 71.051.
182. See Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 674.
183. See Direct Color Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 929 S.W.2d 558, 563 n.1, 567 (Tex. App.
1996); Sarieddine v. Maussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Tex. App. 1991).
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conveniens. 184 Nonetheless, the law also contained safeguards against its
misapplication.185 For example, a suit was subject to the limitation only where
(1) the plaintiff had a cause of action for death or injury under the laws of
Texas or the place where the injury occurred, (2) the action was begun within
the applicable time limitations for both Texas and the place of the injury, and
(3) the plaintiffs country of domicile had equal treaty rights with the United
States. 186 From its opinion, one can only assume that the Court of Appeal was
unaware of the true status of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
Texas. 187 Airbus indeed could not specifically satisfy the requirements for
Texas's version of forum non conveniens in this case. Nonetheless, given the
relative newness of the concept in England, t1 8 it is surprising that the court
could find unconscionable an interpretation of the doctrine that simply did not
quite match the exact shape and scope of the English version.
189
184. See Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 678-79. The Alfaro court only applied what it saw as the strict
mandate of the law. See id. Neither in the lead opinion nor in the concurrence did the court identify the
legislative rationale for abolishing the doctrine. Justice Dogget in his concurrence argued against the
forum non conveniens doctrine based on the rationale that the doctrine's practical effect was to kill
litigation and thereby immunize multinational corporations, though this rationale does not appear to
have come from the Texas legislature. See id. at 680-81 (Dogget, J., concurring).
185. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a)(1)-(4) (West 1990).
186. Section 71.03 1(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides:
An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of this state, of the United States, or
of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of this state, although the wrongful act, neglect, or
default causing the death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:
(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right to maintain an action
for damages for the death or injury;
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the laws of this state for
beginning the action;
(3) for a resident of a foreign state or country, the action is begun in this state within the
time provided by the laws of the foreign state or country in which the wrongful act,
neglect, or default took place; and
(4) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has equal treaty rights with
the United States on behalf of its citizens.
Id.
187. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11 (stating that no state proceedings in
Texas could rely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens). For arguments in defense of Lord Justice
Hobhouse, see supra note 166.
188. Briggs has noted that "[i]t would be a dazzling example of the zeal of the convert for
English law to characterize the lack of a doctrine, which it itself refused to admit until only yesterday, as
oppressive.... [S]ome systems of law have jurisdiction rules which do not need a doctrine offorum non
conveniens to act as a corrective." Briggs, supra note 11, at 99 (footnote omitted).
189. See Fentiman, supra note 82, at 48 (arguing that the foreign forum non conveniens theory
does not need to "replicate its English counterpart exactly"). Australia also interprets forum non
conveniens more narrowly than England. See, e.g., Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills Ltd. (1991) 171 C.L.R.
538 (Austl.) (requiring a showing that the Australian court is clearly an inappropriate forum). In Patel
III, the House of Lords cited favorably to the Australian decision of CSR America Inc. v Cigna
Insurance Australia Ltd. (1997) 146 A.L.R. 402 (Austl.), and quoted a passage from that opinion where
the High Court of Australia expressly relied on Voth. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at
266 (quoting CSR Am., 146 A.L.R. at 437-38). Though indirect, this seems to suggest that the House of
Lords would not find a foreign forum non conveniens standard oppressive for being interpreted more
narrowly than in England. See also Andreas F. Lowenfield, Editorial Comment: Forum Non Conveniens
and Anti-Suit Injunctions: An Update, 92 AM. 3. INT'L L. 41 (1998) (endorsing the Australian High
Court's stricter approach); Andreas F. Lowenfield, Editorial Comment: Forum Shopping, Anti-Suit
Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
314 (1997) (discussing Australia's approach to anti-suit injunctions).
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Third, the English appeal court appeared annoyed that Texas would even
extend personal jurisdiction to Airbus. 9 Unlike the lower court, the Court of
Appeal failed to mention that Airbus sold A320s in Texas; purchased from
U.S. dealers A320 parts that were designed and manufactured in the United
States; and trained the A320 pilots in the United States.191 Furthermore, as the
Court of Appeal did point out, Airbus eventually consented to Texas
jurisdiction. 191 Lord Justice Hobhouse also did not record, and perhaps was
unaware, that a U.S. judge was prepared to dismiss the case for lack of
personal jurisdiction, but for Airbus's indirect consent to such. 193 Moreover, it
is interesting to note that Airbus apparently learned from its strategic litigation
errors in this case and convinced a Texas federal court to dismiss a nearly
identical case in 1994 for lack of personal jurisdiction as well as forum non
conveniens.194 Given each of these factors, not to mention that the scope of
personal jurisdiction in England is itself quite broadly construed, 195 Lord
Justice Hobhouse's indignation with Texas's scope of personal jurisdiction
appears unfounded.
Finally, and the point on which the House of Lords overruled, Lord
Justice Hobhouse failed to fully respect the minor differences existing
between the two forums' legal systems. In short, Lord Justice Hobhouse
190. See Patel II, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11. The court stated: "As regards
Airbus Industrie it apparently was sufficient that it had at some time in the past done business with a
Texas based corporation, for example, selling an aircraft to an airline which had its corporate head office
in Texas." Id. Two of America's largest airlines, American Airlines and Continental Airlines, are
headquartered in Texas.
191. See Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 480-81. It is unclear from the opinion
whether the parts were made and the training was conducted in Texas or somewhere else in the United
States. See id.
192. See Patel I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11.
193. See Linton 1, 30 F.3d at 594-95.
194. See Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 534-35, 537-38 (S.D. Tex.
1994). Kern arose following two air crashes in Katmandu, Nepal in 1992. The crashes were of Airbus
A300s operated internationally by Thai Airways and Pakistan International Airlines. Following an
inquiry, the Nepalese government concluded that the accidents were caused solely by pilot error. See id.
at 528-29.
The plaintiffs filed separate Texas state suits, which were later consolidated, against Airbus. The
plaintiffs were from a variety of European and Asian countries and parts of the United States, however,
no plaintiff was from Texas. Airbus removed the cases to the federal district court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division, and moved for dismissal based on, inter alia, lack of personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. See id. Noting that the crash occurred in Nepal, the flights
originated in Thailand and Pakistan, Airbus manufactured the planes in France, the pilots had not been
trained in the United States, and none of the defendants conducted business in Texas, the court
dismissed the case for both lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. See id. at 534-35,
537-38. Plaintiffs in both the Kern and the Linton cases were represented by at least one of the same
attorneys, while the lead counsel for Airbus were the same in both cases. Compare Kern, 867 F. Supp. at
528, with Linton 111, 934 S.W.2d at 756 (both noting plaintiffs' attorney Michael J. Maloney and Airbus
attorneys Jacques E. Soiret and Thad T. Damris). See generally David N. Zeehandelaar, 1996 Recent
Developments in Aviation Law, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM. 15, 21-22 (1996) (reviewing the Kern case but not
discussing the Airbus case).
195. See Baroda v. Wilderstein, [1972] 2 Q.B. 283 (C.A.) (finding personal jurisdiction where
service was made on defendant who was only transitorily in the jurisdiction and where the case had no
other connections to England); Rules of Supreme Court, Order 11, Rule 1, S.I. 1965, No. 1776 (allowing
service on a party not found within the jurisdiction and subsequently basing subject-matter jurisdiction
on that service).
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simply overemphasized the insignificant, subtle, and formalistic differences
between Texas's and England's use of discretion to grant or deny jurisdiction.
In doing so, he failed to give Texas's judicial system the respect demanded by
comity. 196 This point, along with the House of Lords' view of comity, is
discussed more fully below.
2. Products Liability Law
Lord Justice Hobhouse was also concerned with what he saw as the
inappropriate application of Texas product liability law to the case. First, he
took issue with the fact that Texas law allowed a cause of action based on
strict liability concepts. 197 This alone should not offend an English judge's
notion of fairness. Many other nations, includinp England, have some form of
product liability law based on no fault concepts. 5
Second, even more objectionable to Lord Justice Hobhouse was that the
Texas court might apply Texas product liability law to a tort case arising in
India. 199 The lord justice's offense was misplaced, however, because his
implicit understanding of Texas law was again wrong. Under Texas conflict of
laws rules for torts, the courts applied a most significant relationship test2°0
that in practice worked in much the same way as England's modified version
of lex loci delicti-the law where the tort occurred applies.20 1 Given all the
196. A Canadian commentator has noted regarding Texas jurisdiction:
mhe Texas courts do have a responsible way to ensure that suits brought before them
neither encroach on the sovereignty of foreign jurisdictions nor subject out-of-state
defendants to a forum which has an insufficient connection to the subject matter of the
suit, but this is derived not from the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens but
rather from the U.S. Constitution. The adjudication of geographically complex cases may
require decision makers to be flexible and even imaginative when inquiring into the
nature of foreign legal systems.
Vaughan Black, The Standard of Issuing Anti-Suit Injunctions in Canada, 44 CARSWELL'S PRACTICE
CASES 2D, at 30, 31-32 (1991) (citations omitted).
197. See Patel1, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11.
198. See generally GERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY (1993) (reviewing
no fault standards and product liability law in the European Union, United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Scandinavia, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). Airbus claimed in an unrelated, but
factually similar case, that French product liability law was stricter towards manufacturers than U.S.
product liability law. See Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 538. For a discussion of Kern see supra note 194.
199. See Pate!11, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11.
200. Section 71.031 provided that "[t]he court shall apply the rules of substantive law that are
appropriate under the facts of the case." TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(c) (WVest 1990).
This sub-section was added to section 71.031 to address the holding in Marmon v. Mustang Aviation,
Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968) (holding that Colorado tort law applied to a suit arising from an
airplane crash in Colorado even though defendant was a Texas corporation, the negligent pilot was a
Texas resident, four of five deaths were of Texans, the plane was returning to Texas, and the trial
occurred in Texas), and its progeny, such as McEntire v. Estate of Forte, 463 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.
App. 1971) (applying New Mexico substantive law to an accident in New Mexico during a New Mexico
to Texas flight, even though both the guest and pilot were residents of Texas). See Act of May 29, 1975,
ch. 530 § 2, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381, 1382. In practice, the courts still consider the place of the tort as
a significant, if not the determinative, factor. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 422
(Tex. 1984) (considering New Mexico law, but applying Texas law to an air crash in New Mexico);
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Tex. 1979) (adopting most significant contacts test as
provided in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1988 Revisions)).
201. See Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, ch. 42, §§ 9-15
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facts, including that the crash, the majority of the witnesses, and most of the
evidence were in India, Texas courts would almost certainly apply Indian
substantive law where the action sounded in strict liability and negligence.
20 2
A Texas court would apply local procedural law,20 3 but both the tort law and
its remedies were considered substantive issues governed by the law of the
jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the accident .2  As a
result, the Texas courts would not, as Lord Justice Hobhouse feared, have
found fault based on strict liability or granted punitive damages, 205 unless such
was allowed under Indian law.20 6
The judge's mistaken assumption may be attributed to his inexperience
with the weight given to notice pleadings used in the United States. It appears
that Hobhouse accepted at face value the accuracy of the Patels' claims in
207their complaint on the applicability of Texas law. Faced with the possibility
that their entire case might be enjoined because of their overreaching
statements regarding the state of Texas law in their initial pleadings, the Patels
conceded before the House of Lords that they would not (or could not) rely on
Texas product liability law to establish general liability or punitive
damages.20 In the end, because the Texas courts would apply neither Texas
product liability law nor allow for the recovery of punitive damages in the
(Eng.).
202. Even after the adoption of the most significant contacts test, the presumption remains that
the law of the place of the tort will apply, unless another state has more significant contacts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1988 Revisions).
203. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(b) (West 1990) ("[A]li matters
pertaining to procedure in the prosecution or maintenance of the action in the courts of this state are
governed by the law of this state.").
204. See Hayward v. Southwest Ark. Elec. Coop., 476 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (E.D. Tex. 1979)
(finding that remedies were of substantive law issues).
205. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (quoting Hobhouse, L.J.). One might argue,
however, that if the A320s were defective in manufacturing or design and sold in Texas, then their use
put Texas citizens at risk. The argument continues that because Texas has an interest in protecting its
citizens, this would be best accomplished by imposing no-fault liability and punitive damages on Airbus.
206. Furthermore, even had the Texas court granted punitive damages, many, if not most,
nations would neither recognize nor enforce this portion of the judgment. See, e.g., Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, §§ 5-6 (Eng.) (English statute denying recognition of multiple damages);
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 118, 312 (F.R.G.
1992) (German court refusing to enforce exemplary damages); ICC Case No. 5946 (1990), reprinted in
16 Y.B. COM. ARB. 97, 113 (1991) (Swiss arbitration refusing to enforce punitive damages). But see SA
Consortium Gen. Textiles v. Sun & Sand Agencies Ltd., 1978 Q.B. 279, 299-300 (C.A. 1977) (Eng.)
(allowing French award for r~sistance abusive by finding such damages were not a penalty but rather
part of the costs or exemplary damages).
207. Lord Hobhouse appears to have made his factual conclusions based on the affidavits of the
plaintiffs' complaint. See Patel If, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11. Because of notice pleading
practice in America, however, it is unlikely that an American judge would base conclusions of fact on
the bold conclusory statements of a complaint. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1202, 1253 (Civil 2d 1990 & Supp. 1998). Wright and Miller
provide: "The only function left to be performed by the pleadings is that of notice." Id. § 1202. Further,
"[w]hen a pleader is uncertain whether the foreign law applies or is in doubt as to which country's law
controls, he may refrain from asserting foreign law until it is convenient for him to do so. Consequently
it is not necessary to plead state law, whether it be the forum state's law or the law of another state." Id.
§ 1253 (citations omitted).
208. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 262.
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Indian accident, Lord Justice Hobhouse's reliance on this basis for finding the
Texas proceedings unconscionable was misplaced.
3. Contingency Fees
After disparaging Texas's personal jurisdiction rules and product
liability law, Lord Justice Hobhouse set out to show why the Patels' use of the
contingency fee system was inappropriate. He began by noting that the Patels'
use of contingency fee lawyers "is clearly very strongly influenced by, if not
wholly dependent upon the availability of strict liability in Texas and the
ability to recover damages which exceed the claimants' actual loss and far
exceed those recoverable in other jurisdictions." 20 9 Yet, he cited to no source
for this extreme conclusion, which ignores the fact that the United States has
employed a contingency fee system since before product liability theories or
punitive damages were available.
210
The court later found that, even though the availability of contingent fee
attorneys was a real advantage to the Patels, this advantage was
"illegitimate. 211 In one of the more interesting passages, Lord Justice
Hobhouse stated:
The ability [of the Patels] to finance the Texas proceedings [through contingency fees]
arises from the willingness of the Courts of Texas to apply inappropriate legal criteria to
the determination of liability and the assessment of damages. As I have previously said,
on acceptable principles of conflict of laws, American principles of strict liability and the
award of penal damages have no place in the determination of the liability of Airbus
Industrie to the English claimants in respect to this accident. Their use of the contingent
fee system is part and parcel of their recourse to an inappropriate forum causing injustice
to Airbus Industrie and, consequently, is itself an illegitimate advantage.
212
The court's conclusion is nonsensical, however, because it is both circular and
based on all of the prejudices and errors regarding Texas law noted above.
2 13
Furthermore, the court failed to identify and respect Texas's arguably valid
public policy reasons for allowing contingency fees.
21 4
209. Patel I, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 11.
210. Furthermore, this conclusion in fact proved incorrect, because the Texas attorneys
continued to represent the Patels even after they conceded the application of Texas product liability law
and punitive damages. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text (discussing the Patels'
concessions before the House of Lords).
211. PatelH, supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 18.
212. Id. (emphasis added). It is not clear whether, by "acceptable principles," Lord Justice
Hobhouse meant English, Indian, international, or universal principles.
213. The court's logic is circular because under its rationale whether the availability of
contingency fees is appropriate or inappropriate depends on whether it finds the foreign court to be
appropriate or inappropriate based on the other factors. In other words, the weight of the factor depends
on the outcome of the ultimate issue to which it is supposed to be contributing.
214. The rationale for contingency fees has been treated extensively elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk; and the Provision of
Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 425 (1998); Drew C. Phillips, Contingency Fees: Rules and Ethical Guidelines, I 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 233 (1998); Bradley L. Smith, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their
Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154 (1992).
2000] An American Perspective on Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel 225
In contrast to Lord Justice Hobhouse's finding the availability of
contingency fees in Texas an illegitimate advantage, High Court Justice
Colman held that the Texas fee system was an important advantage because
the Patels did not otherwise have the financing to pursue their claims against
Airbus in India or France, where contingency fee lawyers were not
available.215 Thus, the practical effect of denying the Patels of their Texas
216contingency attorneys was denying them legal representation. In the end,
the court was unjustified in finding that the Patels' use of contingency fee
lawyers was an "illegitimate" advantage.
4. Conclusions Regarding an English Court's View of Texas Law
Two practical observations linger regarding the Court of Appeal's
decision. First, it is surprising how many mistakes the learned judge made
involving the operative facts of the case, including the state of the law in
217Texas. As mentioned above, the judge's errors may have been due to his
over-reliance on the Patels' statement of the case included in their preliminary
pleadings. One lesson, therefore, is that American counsel need to ensure that
foreign counsel can fully explain to the foreign judiciary both the procedural
and substantive law applicable in a U.S. case. As a practical matter, it seems
this would best be accomplished by retaining foreign counsel that have
American experience or training or at a minimum international experience and
sensitivities. Lord Justice Hobhouse's errors also teach American lawyers not
to be overly confident of an English or any foreign judge's ability to
understand complex and unfamiliar American procedural and substantive
law.218 Just as one would be more careful when instructing an American judge
on the law of a foreign jurisdiction, it is imperative that the foreign judge be
instructed more thoroughly and more elementarily when a matter that involves
U.S. law is directly or indirectly relevant.
The second observation is the degree to which Lord Justice Hobhouse
failed to respect arguably valid systemic legal differences between Texas and
England. Because of his factual determinations regarding Texas law, Lord
215. See Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 483. Lord Justice Hobhouse also
recognized this, but did not find the fact persuasive. See Pate! , supra note 3, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at
18.
216. See Patel I, supra note 3, 1996 Int'l Litig. Proc. at 483 ("[I]t must be recognized that in
practical terms, if the injunction is granted, the prosecution of the English claimants' claim against
Airbus Industrie will come to an end.").
217. Issues of foreign law are treated as matters of fact-not law-in England. See CLARKSON
& HILL, supra note 98, at 16. Cf. Parkasho v. Singh, 1968 P. 233, 250 (1966) ("[T]he question of foreign
law, although a question of fact, is a question of fact of a peculiar kind, and the same considerations do
not apply in considering whether and to what extent this court should interfere with the decision of the
[lay] magistrates, as in the case of the ordinary questions of fact [e.g., the factual issues that would be
decided by a jury in the United States] which come before a magistrates' court.").
218. A U.S. attorney may be particularly susceptible to becoming overly confident, and
correspondingly overly reliant, on the foreign judge when the foreign legal system, like England's, is
based on the common law and conducted in the English language. See generally ATIYAH & SUMMERS,
supra note 166 (discussing the significant differences in English and American courts' and lawyers'
practical approach to the law).
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Justice Hobhouse was comfortable impinging on Texas's comity. However,
his factual determinations were wrong. As a result, his opinion exemplifies the
dangers inherent in trying to make a discretionary decision that requires
balancing the justice offered by a system which is not one's own.219 Because
the court is not familiar with the practice or law of the foreign jurisdiction,
blatant errors and, more commonly, mistaken assumptions are inevitable. This
is precisely what happened to Lord Justice Hobhouse. The lesson, therefore, is
that to the extent possible counsel needs to ensure either that the judge is
thoroughly familiar with the intricacies of the foreign law of the case, or that
he is willing to rely on comity, rather than a subjective inquiry into the
sufficiencies of the foreign law.
B. An English Approach to Anti-Suit Injunctions
In Patel III, the House of Lords directed English judges henceforth to
respect, as much as possible, the principles of comity and refrain from
subjective inquiries into the sufficiency of foreign law. 220 This is exactly the
type of test a nation would hope that its global neighbors would employ. This
international or stricter approach shows great respect for and deference to
another nation's judicial and legal systems and to a large degree precludes a
court from making demeaning case-by-case inquiries into the adequacies and
inadequacies of a foreign system. For the protection of one's own citizens,
however, it is arguable that the best approach might be to allow the home
courts to consider unhindered the specific justice provided by a foreign court.
Under this nationalistic or laxer approach, the local court would be better able
to protect its citizens from vexatious litigation and inefficient concurrent
proceedings. In America, the U.S. federal circuit courts are divided evenly
between these two approaches.22 t
Because the U.S. circuit courts have embraced both the stricter and the
laxer approaches, there is already much judicial
222  and academic 223
219. English commentators and courts have cautioned: "Many foreign laws are different and
even strange to English eyes but 'those who live in legal glass houses, however well constructed, should
perhaps not be over-astute to throw stones at the laws of other countries."' CLARKSON & HILL, supra
note 98, at 529 (quoting in part Regina v. Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, [1968] 3
W.L.R. 531, 537 (C.A.)).
220. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 271.
221. See supra note 136 (identifying the split between the circuit courts).
222. See, e.g., Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627-28 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding
decision to grant an anti-suit injunction); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425,
431-33 (7th Cir. 1993) (advocating the laxer approach); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d
1349, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1992) (advocating the stricter approach); China Trade and Dev. Corp v. M.V.
Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1987) (advocating the stricter approach); Laker Airways,
Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937-45 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reviewing judicial treatment of comity); Seattle
Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming
grant of anti-suit injunction).
223. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, The Use ofAnti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation,
28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 589, 630-31 (1990) (advocating the stricter approach); Trevor Hartley,
Comity and the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 35 AM. J. COMp. L. 487, 509
(1987) (advocating the stricter approach); Markus Lenenbach, supra note 136, at 322-23 (advocating
the laxer approach); Haig Najarian, Granting Comity its Due: A Proposal to Revive the Comity-Based
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commentary regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. In
fact, it has been noted that "This important divergence renders the issue ripe
for clarification by the Supreme Court."224 In support of the laxer approach,
courts and commentators argue that it is more efficient and flexible. Primarily
because the injunctions are more freely granted under the laxer approach, the
court can prevent concurrent proceedings and their corresponding
inefficiencies and costs. The courts also characterize this reasoning as
protecting U.S. citizens from spurious foreign lawsuits. Furthermore, from a
practical standpoint, the laxer approach is advantageous in that it
prophylactically prevents inconsistent and conflicting rulings and judgments
22when multiple courts are hearing the same issue. 25 Recently one commentator
has also argued that the laxer approach is better for "protecting the private
parties' rights and enforcing their duties."
226
In addition to these traditional arguments for the laxer approach, Chief
Judge Richard Posner has promoted a modified laxer standard requiring an
empirical showing that the anti-suit injunction will directly infringe the
foreign nation's judicial or political sovereignty before comity will be
considered.227 Chief Judge Posner suggests that evidence of such interstate
interference must come from official statements by entities such as the U.S.
State Department or the foreign country's Office of Foreign Affairs.228 In the
case before him, however, Chief Judge Posner found that a statement from
Approach to Transnational Anti-Suit Injunctions, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 961, 984-85 (1994)
(advocating the stricter approach); Eric Roberson, Comity Be Damned: The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions
Against the Courts of a Foreign Nation, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 409, 433 (1998) (advocating the stricter
approach); Laura Salava, Balancing Comity with Anti-Suit Injunctions: Considerations Beyond
Jurisdiction, 205 J. LEGIS. 267, 269-70 (1994) (advocating the stricter approach); Michael Schimek,
supra note 63, at 520-24 (1993) (advocating the stricter approach); Steven R. Swanson, The
Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: International Comity and Anti-Suit Injunctions, 30 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 36-37 (1996) (advocating the stricter approach); Note, Anti-Suit Injunctions and
International Comity, 71 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1070 (1985) (advocating the stricter approach).
224. Swanson, supra note 223, at 36. The Supreme Court, however, has passed on the
opportunity to clarify the issue. See Achilles Corp. v. Kaepa, Inc., 519 U.S. 821 (1996) (denying
certiorari). Two commentators on the subject have advocated legislative solutions, absent the Supreme
Court clarifying the position. See Roberson, supra note 223, at 433 (advocating extending the Anti-
Injunction Act of 1793, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994), which is similar to a
codification of the stricter standard and which forbids federal courts from enjoining state courts except
in limited situations, to international disputes); Salava, supra note 223, at 269-70 (advocating
codification of the stricter standard as an amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 65(f)).
225. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627-28; Allendale, 10 F.3d at 431-33; Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at
856; see also Lenenbach, supra note 136, at 261 (arguing that the laxer rule is more efficient).
226. Lenenbach, supra note 136, at 323 (arguing that the stricter approach overemphasizes
protection of foreign nations' sovereignty). This rationale seems to fail to consider the different
occasions when an anti-suit injunction may be sought. See Bermann, supra note 223, at 627-28
(classifying anti-suit injunctions into three categories: (1) for violations of public policy; (2) for
violations of private parties' obligations; and (3) based on inconvenience, vexatiousness, or oppression).
As both the laxer approach and the stricter approach appear to be in agreement regarding the need to
allow anti-suit injunctions more liberally for violations of public policy and private party obligations, the
real divergence in the approaches occurs regarding anti-suit injunctions based on vexatiousness or
oppression.
227. See Allendale, 10 F.3d at 431. In the words of Chief Judge Posner: "[the court] wanted
some empirical flesh [i.e., evidence] on the [stricter approach's] theoretical skeleton." Id.
228. See id.
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France's Insurance Commission was insufficient. 229 He reasoned that the
Commission's amicus curiae brief did not provide whether it had the authority
to speak for the French state and that the Commission's arguments regarding
the interference that would be caused by an injunction were unconvincing.
230
The practical effect of this approach is significant in that it overturns the
initial presumption in favor of non-intervention and shifts the burden of proof
regarding comity onto the party defending the anti-suit injunction.
231
The courts and academics advocating the stricter or comity approach
rely on a variety of competing rationales. First and most basically, the stricter
standard emphasizes the need for respect among nations. These courts argue
that this comity approach sends a message of confidence in and respect for
foreign courts as co-equals. Correspondingly, based on this respect,
international judicial cooperation is promoted and future retaliations are
avoided.232 Second, the comity group notes that the stricter standard promotes
certainty and predictability, because courts applying this view only grant
injunctions in limited situations. The corollary to this reasoning is that
predictability benefits international commerce by lowering risks and
transaction costs. 233 Third, the courts note that a stricter standard for granting
anti-suit injunctions limits the possibility of conflicting anti-suit and anti-anti-
suit injunctions.234 This actually occurred in the Laker case235 and is the worst-
case scenario because, by eliminating all possible forums for resolution, it
effectively prevents the dispute from being resolved on its merits. Fourth,
advocates of the stricter rule argue that it is mandated because granting an
injunction often directly or indirectly impinges on international politics, which
is more appropriately left to the executive branch.236 This rationale seems to
229. See id.
230. Seeid. at431-32.
231. Leaving the theoretical merits or demerits of Chief Judge Posner's rule aside, in
application this standard would create a number of practical problems, such as delays necessary to
procure official statements. These problems would be borne primarily by the party seeking to avoid the
injunction. Furthermore, as Chief Judge Posner applied his own rule, it appears that very few, if any,
parties will be able to meet his empirical requirements. This is because only a few persons or entities
will be able to speak on behalf of the foreign country's interest and the degree to which these official
bodies will seek to involve themselves in private disputes is seriously circumspect. It is also because, as
Chief Judge Posner applied the rule, the U.S. courts, based on their own assessment of the facts and the
foreign interests, will be able to ignore or discount the official foreign statements asserting interference
if they choose to do so. This substitution of one's own judgment for the official determinations already
made within the lexfori is one of the specific concerns that the strict comity approach is aimed at
avoiding.
232. See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1992); Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Bermann, supra note 223, at 630,
631 (arguing that the stricter approach is more respectful); Najarian, supra note 223, at 983-84 (same);
Note, supra note 223, at 1070 (same).
233. See, e.g., Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354-55; China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong
Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1987); Laker, 731 F.2d at 937-45; see also Salava, supra note 223, at
269; Schimek, supra note 63, at 520-24.
234. See, e.g., Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354-55; China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36-37; Laker, 731
F.2d at 937-45.
235. See supra note 152 (discussing the Laker case).
236. See, e.g., Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354-55; China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36-37; Laker, 731
F.2d at 937-45; see also Swanson, supra note 223, at 36 (arguing that an imposition on international
affairs is more appropriate for the executive branch); Note, supra note 223, at 1070 (same).
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address the same concerns that Chief Judge Posner's laxer approach raises,
but errs on the side of non-interference. Fifth, it has been noted that applying
the laxer rule significantly complicates the courts' task by requiring them to
weigh a number of ambiguous factors such as differences among nations'
substantive laws and remedies. 237 This flexible and amorphous balancing in
turn results in an increase in the number of parties seeking its relief.238 The
end result is that international litigation is further complicated and delayed.
Finally, some courts note that the less obtrusive option of refusing to enforce a
judgment issued in the foreign concurrent proceeding is also available. 239 This
option allows the foreign court an opportunity to exercise jurisdiction and,
depending upon that outcome, may avoid the need for the local court to act at
all.
Despite the broad development of academic and judicial commentary,
Airbus adds to this discourse (1) a pointed example of the danger of adopting
the laxer or nationalistic approach, (2) new persuasive authority from the
clearly articulated opinion of one nation's highest court, and (3) the
international context in which a U.S. court will necessarily be acting. First, as
discussed above, the Court of Appeal's opinion is a superlative example of the
dangers inherent in applying a laxer approach to the granting of an anti-suit
injunction where the determinative test is largely based on the subjective
balancing of multiple variables. Under this approach, the court necessarily
must review the adequacy of justice available in the foreign court. This
requires evidence and determinations regarding the status of foreign
substantive and procedural law. As Lord Justice Hobhouse's failures illustrate,
even when the two systems are as closely related as the English and American
systems, the court may commit serious errors and draw erroneous inferences.
In addition, the review of a foreign judicial system is an inefficient and
cumbersome judicial process that, more often than not, is compounded by
differences in language, society, and legal systems much greater than in the
Anglo-American case.24° Furthermore, one hopes that the litigating parties
ensure that the court is fully and correctly versed on the foreign law, but as
was likely the case in the Court of Appeal, the parties are not always able or
willing to thoroughly educate the bench. As the Court of Appeal case so
vividly shows, a rule that requires even the best judges to make comparative
value judgments regarding the adequacy of justice available abroad is a
dangerous and inefficient prospect.
Second, the House of Lords findings offer new and persuasive authority
in favor of the stricter, international comity approach. Lord Goff did not
expressly state his reasons for adopting the stricter rule, but his speech
237. See Bermann, supra note 223, at 630.
238. See id.
239. See Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355; Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 630 (5th Cir.
1996) (Garza, J., dissenting).
240. The improvement in efficiency made by keeping all the proceedings in one court is one of
the most significant arguments made in favor of the laxer standard. See supra note 225 and
accompanying text. If efficiency may be achieved to the same degree by the stricter standard, however,
this objective may be accomplished without intruding into the foreign court's authority.
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highlighted his concerns. Lord Goffs formulation of the problem suggested
that his primary interest was respect for the diversity of legal systems in the
world today.241 For example, he acknowledged that the common law's
methods represented only one option among the many available. He noted that
the civil law nations' approach to concurrent jurisdiction is based on a
completely different set of presumptions. Civil law courts generally employ
rigid jurisdictional rules to avoid clashes between states or do not object to
concurrent proceedings. Thus, these countries do not need to rely on forum
non conveniens or other theories to facilitate consolidated proceedings in a
different jurisdiction.242 Nevertheless, this approach has proven to be a
workable option.
243
The court also noted that England's own first-hand experience under the
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters suggests that the civilian approach may even
work in England.244 The Brussels Convention governs the exercise of
jurisdiction by European Union Contracting States when the parties
concurrently file actions in more than one EU court.245 The Convention was
originally drafted solely by civilians and reflects that approach.246
Nonetheless, since England's accession to the Convention, it has proven
workable for English litigants and courts. 247 Therefore, both the experiences
of the civil law nations and England under the Brussels Convention suggest
that the differences in how states deal with issues of jurisdiction may be more
formalistic than substantive. Because of this, it appears that Lord Goff was
less willing to declare a foreign system unconscionable simply because it was
different. This respect for a foreign jurisdiction's laws, administration, and
adjudication is the essence of comity.
248
241. Goff began his analysis of the casd from the extremely broad foundation of looking at the
two worldwide approaches to concurrent litigation: the common law nations' use of broad jurisdiction
rules with forum non conveniens limitations and the civil law nations' use of specific rules for taking
and declining jurisdiction with allowances of concurrent litigation. See Patel II, supra note 4, [1998] 2
All E.R. at 263.
242. See id. This fundamentally different approach also appears to be at the heart of the
difference between the rationales of the laxer and stricter approaches. The laxer faction makes a great
point out of the inefficiency and wastefulness of concurrent proceedings that may be avoided by
granting an injunction, see Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852,
856 (9th Cir. 1981), while the stricter faction begins with the premise that, despite possible
inefficiencies, parallel proceedings do not need to be avoided per se; see China Trade and Dev. Corp. v.
M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 926-
27 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
243. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 263.
244. See id.
245. See CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 98, at 60.
246. See id.
247. See Patel III, supra note 4, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 263.
248. As the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia stated:
[T]he central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign
tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international
cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability
through satisfaction of mutual expectations.
Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Finally, the strict comity-based rule adopted in Patel III conforms to a
developing international standard. The House of Lords found that Canada,
Australia, and half of the courts in the United States followed a comity-based
rule for granting anti-suit injunctions. England may now be added to that list.
Conformity to an international standard, or at least uniformity among the
common law countries, is advantageous. First, if most nations use the same
standard, then international law will become more predictable. Predictability
in turn produces benefits for international commercial actors and lawyers.
Second, if there is near uniformity about when to accept, decline, and force
jurisdiction, cases should move more smoothly and efficiently towards their
natural or appropriate forums. An international standard for anti-suit
injunctions, therefore, will lessen those occasions when resort to such
injunctions becomes necessary.
The Airbus case adds perspective to the American debate over the
standard for granting anti-suit injunctions. The Patel II case, in which the
English court infringed on the jurisdiction of a Texas court, provided the
unique perspective of how the laxer, nationalistic approach for granting
injunctions can unfairly and unreasonably impede a competent court from
hearing a case. For a change, the U.S. court was on the receiving end of what
the Sixth Circuit has referred to as "[t]he message, intended or not, that the
issuing court has so little confidence in the foreign court's ability to adjudicate
a given dispute fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling even to allow the
possibility." 249 Patel III adds the persuasive authority of the House of Lords
for a standard based on comity. Significantly, the lords adopted the comity
standard only after England's experience of having to adapt to the civilian
approach of the Brussels Convention, which has proven different and yet
entirely adequate. In short, Patel II1 identifies and explains the international
context and environment in which American courts must necessarily act. By
defining and promoting an international standard, Patel 1rs comity-based
rule contributes to a more efficient resolution of jurisdictional disputes
between nations.
CONCLUSION
So what can an American lawyer learn from the English courts'
treatment of the Airbus case? First, Patel 11 teaches the practical importance of
fully educating foreign counsel and judges on the complexities and subtleties
of the American substantive and procedural law directly and indirectly
involved. Second, Patel 11 gives an excellent example of the inherent dangers
of the nationalistic or laxer approach to granting anti-suit injunctions, where
the decision is based solely on the subjective balancing of factors and
judgments regarding the adequacy of the foreign legal system. Third, Patel I1
provides England's highest court's clearly articulated rationale for adopting
the international or comity approach to deciding whether to grant an anti-suit
249. Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992).
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injunction. Whether American courts will follow the lead of the House of
Lords and refer to a foreign jurisdiction's handling of the same international
issue remains to be seen. Considering the direct and disruptive impact anti-suit
injunctions have on foreign jurisdictions, not to mention the accompanying
insult of perceived inadequacy, it is hoped that the next American court asked
to prevent a foreign court from hearing an issue will consider Airbus and will
employ an approach that similarly emphasizes the doctrine of international
comity.
